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The Curry-Howard correspondence connects derivations in natural deduction with the
lambda-calculus. Predicates are types, derivations are terms. This supports reasoning from
assumptions to conclusions, but we may want to reason backwards; from the desired con-
clusion towards the assumptions. At intermediate stages wemay have a partial derivation,
with holes.
This is natural in informal practice but it can be difﬁcult to formalise. The informal act
of ﬁlling holes in a partial derivation suggests a capturing substitution, since holes may
occur in the scope of quantiﬁer introduction rules. As other authors have observed, this is
not immediately supported by the lambda-calculus. Also, universal quantiﬁcation requires
a ‘fresh name’ and it is not immediately obvious what formal meaning to assign to this
notion if derivations are incomplete. Further issues arise with proof-normalisation; this
corresponds with lambda-calculus reduction, which can require alpha-conversion to avoid
capture when beta-reducing, and it is not immediately clear how to alpha-convert a name
in an incomplete derivation.
We apply a one-and-a-half level technique based on nominal terms to construct a Curry-
Howard correspondence for ﬁrst-order logic. This features two levels of variable, but with
no lambda-abstraction at the second level. Predicates are types, derivations are terms,
proof-normalisation is reduction — and the two levels of variable are, respectively, the
assumptions and the holes of an incomplete derivation.
We give notions of proof-term, typing, alpha-conversion and beta-reduction for our syntax.
We prove conﬂuence, we exhibit several admissible rules including a proof that instanti-
ation of level two variables is type-safe — this corresponds with the act of ﬁlling holes in
an incomplete derivation, and can be viewed as a form of Cut-rule — and we explore the
connectionwith traditional Curry-Howard in the case that thederivation is in fact complete.
Our techniques are not speciﬁcally tailored to ﬁrst-order logic and the same ideas should
be applicable without any essential new difﬁculties to similar logical systems.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Curry-Howard correspondence [45,38] corresponds logic with typed λ-calculus as follows:
predicates types
derivations terms
discharge correspond(s) with λ-abstraction
modus-ponens application
β-reduction proof-normalisation
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For example,1
[A]a A⇒B
B
[A]a A⇒B⇒C
B⇒C
C
a
A⇒C
corresponds with λa.((pa)qa) (1)
where a has type A, p has type A ⇒ B ⇒ C, and q has type A ⇒ B.
The typed λ-calculus yields a model of the ‘forwards’ construction of derivations; we plug together derivations to form
larger ones, and we plug together λ-terms to form larger ones. However, we may wish to reason starting from the desired
conclusion andworkingbackwards, ﬁlling in thederivation aswego. At intermediate stages thederivationwill be incomplete,
for example as below with a ‘hole’ called X:
··· X
B
[A]a A⇒B⇒C
B⇒C
C
a
A⇒C
An incomplete derivation.
Here the λ-calculus is less helpful; X corresponds with qa in the complete derivation, so (being straightforward about
it) the incomplete derivation above corresponds with ‘λa.((pa)X)’. But X is under a λ-binder and should be instantiated;
substituted for without avoiding capture, and the λ-calculus does not contain a single operation to represent capturing
substitution.
The reader can ﬁnd extensive discussion of motivations for considering capturing substitution — which include but are
not limited to representation of incomplete derivations — in [4, Section 2.1 onwards], [35, Section 1.4.1], and also in [15,16,
Section 1].
Most interesting logics are undecidable, so theorem-proving is often interactive (AUTOMATH [9] and descendents like
Isabelle [37] and HOL [17]). This motivates us to study intermediate proof-states. In addition, a well-known ﬁeld of proof-
theory is devoted to reasoning from conclusions to assumptions; goal-directed proof-theory [24]. To our knowledge no
Curry-Howard correspondence has been developed for goal-directed proof-theory.
This leads us to study what formal syntaxes, logics, and calculi underlie incomplete derivations and their reﬁnement to
complete ones.
We propose an approach based on nominal terms [44]. Nominal terms have two levels of variable: variables of level one
a, b, c, . . . and variables of level two X , Y , Z , . . . Substitution of variables of level two does not avoid capture by variables of
level one, so capturing substitution is directly represented by substitution of variables of level two. The incomplete derivation
above is represented by the nominal term λa.((pa)X), and substitution of X for qa returns λa.((pa)(qa)). Full deﬁnitions will
follow.
Nominal terms can be the basis of expressive, mathematically well-behaved, and implementable systems. They were
introduced in a uniﬁcation algorithm (freshness conditions are constraints) [44] which was implemented as the basis of a
logic programming language [8]. The ﬁrst author in collaboration has applied them to rewriting [12], universal algebra [30],
schematic reasoning in ﬁrst-order logic [19], and most recently a two-level λ-calculus [21].2
In brief, nominal terms feature a two-level hierarchy of variables: variables of level one a, b, c, d, . . . and variables of
level two X , Y , Z , . . . Here is an example of our system in action:
(1)
··· X⊥⇒A
(2)
[⊥]··· X⊥⇒A
(3)
[⊥]··· X′
A
(⇒I)⊥⇒A
(4)
[⊥]
(⊥E)
A
(⇒I)⊥⇒A
(1) X:⊥⇒A  X:⊥⇒A
(2) X:⊥⇒A, a:⊥; a#X  X:⊥⇒A
(3) a:⊥, X′:A  λa.X′:⊥⇒A
(4) a:⊥  λa.xf(a):⊥⇒A
On the left is a reﬁnement of an incomplete derivation of ⊥ ⇒ A to a complete derivation, represented by λa.xf(a).
Here xf (for ex-falsum) is a constant representing ⊥-elimination. On the right is their representation as terms-in-context in
one-and-a-half level Curry-Howard using nominal terms. Note that:
1 We are grateful to Jojgov for the examples in his paper [28].
2 Within the context of nominal terms, we use the following naming convention: ‘one-level’ refers to calculi without nominal unknowns; ‘one-and-
a-halfth level’ refers to calculi possessing unknowns but with no quantiﬁcation or abstraction over them, and ‘two-level’ refers to calculi with nominal
unknowns and the ability to quantify or abstract over them. See [21] for a detailed discussion.
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• Assumptions are represented by variables of level one. Types are predicates assumed.
• Incomplete parts of the derivation, or (terminology from theorem-proving) subgoals, are represented by variables of level
two, and, informally, are instantiated to any term sharing their type, to obtain a well-typed term.3 Types are predicates
to be proved.
• Freshness conditions a#X , read in the literature as ‘a is fresh for X ’ [44] mean here that ‘amust be discharged in whatever
X is instantiated to’.
The reﬁnement of the lambda-term, above, follows closely the development of a proof in natural deduction; only stage
(2) is a ‘technical’ stage, representing the injection of a level one variable of type ⊥ into a typing and freshness context.
We are reasonably ambitious in our choice of the types for our nominal terms. Our types correspond with ﬁrst-order
predicate logic without equality (see Deﬁnition 2). Note that this logic is strictly less expressive than ﬁrst-order logic with
function-symbols or with equality, but because it includes a binder ∀ it sufﬁces to raise the issues of interest to us in this
paper. The extension to full ﬁrst-order logic is future work.
This paper treats incomplete ﬁrst-order logic derivations, but there seems no obvious obstacle to applying the same ideas
to logics other that ﬁrst-order logic. In particular, we believe that the techniques represented in this paper would extend
smoothly to the application considered byMuñoz of a theory of incomplete terms-and-types in dependent type theory [35].
1.1. Overview of the paper
In Section 2 we introduce syntax in Deﬁnition 5 and typing rules for the syntax in Deﬁnition 14, with some discussion of
the rules in Remark 16 and with example derivations in Section 2.4.
In Section 3 we describe some admissible rules, including in Section 3.3 a rule for instantiating variables of level two (i.e.
ﬁlling in unknown parts of a derivation) which features as a form of Cut. The proof of admissibility of Cut (Lemma 35 and
Theorem 36) is a proof of soundness for instantiating variables of level two, as we dowhenwe transform a term representing
an incomplete derivation to a term representing a complete one.4
In Section 4 we consider traditional natural deduction derivation and show that our Curry-Howard system is sound
(Theorem 41) and complete (Theorem 42) for the case of terms without variables of level one (representing complete
derivations). That is: once an incomplete term is instantiated to a complete term in our system, it really does represent a
natural deduction derivation of the predicate represented by its type.
In Section5wedevelop a theoryofβ-reduction for our calculus, correspondingvia theCurry-Howardparadigmtoanotion
of proof-normalisation. Important technical results are subject reduction (Theorem 48), the identiﬁcation of canonical forms
(Deﬁnition 57), and conﬂuence (Theorem 62). β-Reduction is non-trivial in our calculus, because terms containing variables
of level two raise issues to do with α-equivalence and β-reduction. The reader can ﬁnd discussions of this in the authors’
recent publications [15,16,21], as well as in other authors’ work [4, Section 2.1 onwards], [35, Section 1.4.1], and also in
[15,16, Section 1]. The solutions used by the calculus of this paper build on ideas presented in previous work using nominal
terms [15,16,19,21] but they are non-trivial extensions of that work, since the calculus of this paper represents derivations
of ﬁrst-order logic, and is therefore particularly rich.
Finally, in Section 6, we give a technical survey of the literature on incomplete derivations, and propose future work.
2. Syntax of types (predicates) and terms (derivations), with examples
2.1. Terms, types and typable terms
Types (Deﬁnition 2) are the syntax of predicates of ﬁrst-order logic. Terms (Deﬁnition 5) are the syntax of a λ-calculus. As
we shall see, it will be possible to assign types to terms such that terms represent (incomplete) ﬁrst-order logic derivations;
this is explored with some detailed examples in Section 2.4.
Fix disjoint countably inﬁnite sets of level one and level two variables. We let a, b, c, d, . . . range over level one variables,
andX , Y , Z , . . . rangepermutativelyover level twovariables.Weuseapermutativeconvention thata, b, c, . . . andX , Y , Z , . . .
range over distinct elements. For example ‘a and b’ means ‘two distinct level one variables’, and . ‘X , Y , and Z ’ means ‘three
distinct level two variables’.
Remark 1. Level one variables are derived from nominal term atoms, and level two variables are derived from nominal term
unknowns [44]. In keepingwithmore recent work [21,15,16] we prefer the ‘levels’ terminology. Note that the variables in this
paper (also in keeping with [21,15,16]) display λ-abstraction and β-reduction behaviour, which nominal terms atoms and
unknowns do not display. The variables here are also typed, with types representing predicates of ﬁrst-order logic as will be
described below. Thus, the syntax here is not the same thing as the nominal terms of [44], but if we remove β-conversion,
3 See Fig. 3 for more details.
4 This paper does not internalise proof-search. We prove that instantiation of level two variables is admissible, but we have no explicit instantiation rule,
no backtracking rule, and so on. How to get from incomplete derivations to complete derivations is a separate issue, for us, from how to represent the
incomplete derivations — but an interesting one which could be the topic of future work. See the discussion of McBride’s system in Section 6.
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typing, and the theorems we prove about them in this paper — then we are left with α-equivalence, and the α-equivalence
used in this paper is indeed that introduced in [44].
Deﬁnition 2. Fix type-formers P,Q,R and type term-formers f, g, h, to each of which is associated an arity (−) which is a
nonnegative integer (0, 1, 2, . . .).
Deﬁne type terms and types by:
g ::= a|f(g1, . . . , gar(f))
φ,ψ , ξ ::= ⊥ | φ ⇒ φ | P(g1, · · · , gar(P)) | ∀a.φ
g will range over type terms. φ,ψ , and ξ will range over types.
For example ∀a.(P(a, a) ⇒ P(a, b)) is a type if ar(P) = 2.
Wewrite≡ for syntactic identity andweequate typesup to∀-boundvariables of level one (so for example∀a.∀b.P(a, b) ≡
∀b.∀a.P(b, a)).5 Implication associates to the right; for example φ ⇒ ψ ⇒ ξ ≡ φ ⇒ (ψ ⇒ ξ).
Intuitively, types are ﬁrst-order logic predicates.
Deﬁnition 3. Deﬁne the free level one variables as standard by:
fa(a) = {a}
fa(f(g1, . . . , gn)) = fa(g1) ∪ · · · ∪ fa(gn)
fa(P(g1, . . . , gn)) = fa(g1) ∪ · · · ∪ fa(gn)
fa(φ ⇒ ψ) = fa(φ) ∪ fa(ψ)
fa(⊥) =∅
fa(∀a.φ) = fa(φ)\{a}
Deﬁnition 4. Call a bijection π on level one variables a permutationwhen {a | π(a) /= a} is ﬁnite. π ,π ′,π ′′, . . . will range
over permutations.
Write id for the identity permutation, so id(a) = a for all variables of level one, a. Call π ◦π ′ the composition of
permutations π and π ′, so (π ◦π ′)(a) = π(π ′(a)). Write π-1 for the inverse of π , whereby π ◦π-1 = id = π-1◦π .
Write (a b) for the swapping permutation, which sends a to b, b to a and all other c to themselves.
Deﬁnition 5. Let terms be:
r, s, t, . . . ::= g | π·X | λa.r | r′r | xf(r)
We write ≡ for syntactic equivalence.
(We do not quotient terms by α-equivalence; thus for example λa.a ≡ λb.b.)
We may write (λa.r)t as r[a → t], for example (λa.b)a ≡ b[a → a]. We may write r′r as r′(r). Application associates to
the left, so r′′r′r ≡ (r′′r′)r; sometimes we will bracket anyway.
In Deﬁnition 5, we say π in π·X is suspended on X , with intuition ‘π acts on whatever X is instantiated to’. Consistent
with previous work [44] we may write ‘X ’ for ‘id·X ’. Note that later, we deﬁne π·r (Deﬁnition 11); this is meta-level notation
for an action of π on r, whereas π·X is directly syntax.
Deﬁnition 6. A type assignment is a pair of the form a : φ where a ∈ fa(φ), or X : φ, or a : *. A typing context 	 is a ﬁnite
set of type assignments, which is functional in the sense that:
• If a : φ ∈ 	 then a : * ∈ 	. If a : * ∈ 	 then a : φ ∈ 	.• If a : φ ∈ 	 and a : φ′ ∈ 	 then φ = φ′. Similarly for X .
As is standard we may drop set brackets, writing for example 	, a : φ for 	 ∪ {a : φ}. Intuitively, a : φ means ‘a has type
φ’; a : * means ‘a is a type variable’; X : φ means ‘X has type φ’.
Remark 7. Weuse the same syntactic class (variables of level one) to represent type variables and term variables. The typing
context differentiates them; a : φ ∈ 	 means a behaves like a term variable; a : * ∈ 	 means a behaves like a type variable.
We could make a syntactic separation between variables of level one that can have types (a : φ ∈ 	), and variables of
level one that can appear in types (a : * ∈ 	). However, we would duplicate the treatments of λ-abstraction, application,
and freshness. Our approach keeps the machinery shorter, at the expense of raw syntax being less inherently ‘sorted’.
5 The ﬁrst author is known for studying the problem of reasoning on datatypes up to α-equivalence. We do not study that problem in this paper.
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Fig. 1. Typing and freshness derivation rules.
Deﬁnition 8. Call a pair a#r of a variable of level one and a term a freshness. Call a freshness of the form a#X primitive. Call
a ﬁnite set of primitive freshnesses a freshness context. 
 will range over freshness contexts.
Deﬁnition 9. Call 	;
  r a term-in-context. Call 	;
  r : φ a typing sequent. Call 	;
  a#r a freshness sequent.
Deﬁnition 10. We deﬁne some useful notions for working with types and freshnesses:
• If  is a set of types, write fa() for⋃{fa(φ) | φ ∈ }.
• If X is a set of variables of level two, write a#X for the freshness context {a#X | X ∈ X }.
• Write b ∈ 
 when b#X ∈ 
 for all X .
Deﬁnition 11. Deﬁne permutation actions on type terms, types, and terms by:
π·a ≡ π(a) π·f(g1, . . . , gn) ≡ f(π·g1, . . . ,π·gn)
π·⊥ ≡ ⊥ π·(φ ⇒ ψ) ≡ (π·φ) ⇒ (π·ψ)
π·∀a.φ ≡ ∀π(a).π·φ π·P(g1, . . . , gn) ≡ P(π·g1, . . . ,π·gn)
π·(π ′·X) ≡ (π ◦π ′)·X π·(r′r) ≡ (π·r′)(π·r)
π·λa.r ≡ λπ(a).(π·r) π·xf(r) ≡ xf(π·r)
Deﬁnition 12. Deﬁne a substitution action φ[a := b] on types by the usual capture-avoiding substitution on predicates.
For example, if f is a type term-formerwith arity 2 and∼ is a type former of arity 2, then (∀b.(f(a, b) ∼ c))[a := f(b, c)] =
∀b′.(f(f(b, c), b′) ∼ c.
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Fig. 2. Natural deduction style derivation rules.
Deﬁnition 13. Write 	  π when for every a such that π(a) /= a, precisely one of the following holds:
• a : * ∈ 	 and π(a) : * ∈ 	,• a : φ ∈ 	 and π(a) : π·φ ∈ 	, for some φ.
Deﬁnition 14. Let the derivable typing and freshness sequents be inductively deﬁned by the rules in Fig. 1. We use the
following notation here and later:
• Side-conditions are written in brackets.
• A ranges over typings or freshnesses, so A ∈ {r : φ, a : *, a#r}.• If a sequent −  − is not derivable we write −  −.
• We write important(	;
  r) for {φ | a : φ ∈ 	, 	;
  a#r}.
If φ exists such that 	;
  r : φ is derivable, call 	;
  r typable.
We may write ‘	;
  r : φ’ for ‘	;
  r : φ is a derivable typing sequent’, and similarly for ‘	;
  a#r’.
Remark 15. A few brief comments on these rules:
• The side-condition b ∈ 
 in (Tfr) ensures that (Tfr) removes all mention of b from the freshness context.
• (TX) is syntax-directed on the term being typed (π·X). Note that π·φ has the same top-level type term-former as φ; we
merely permute the level one variables.
• Away to read important(	;
  r), recalling that r representsan incompletenaturaldeductionderivation, is: “thepossible
assumptions of instantiations of r to complete natural deduction derivations”.
• The condition 	;
  a#b in (a#λb) is not redundant. For example, it fails if a : * ∈ 	, b : ψ ∈ 	, and a ∈ fa(ψ).
Remark 16. Wecompare the rules in Fig. 1, for typing nominal terms,with the rules in Fig. 2,which describe standard natural
deduction:
• Compare (T⊥E)with (⊥E). ‘xf’ stands for ex-falsum. (T⊥E) correspondswith (⊥E) in a standardway. No surprises here.
• Compare (T⇒I)with (⇒I). (T⇒I) does not discharge a : φ because r may contain a variable of level two X . We intend
X to be instantiated to t which (because instantiation need not avoid capture) may mention a; see Deﬁnition 26. We
remember a : φ in the typing context so that we can use it to build t, if we like. This is not a problem: we canmimic (⇒I)
using (T⇒I) and (Tfr). An effect of this design choice is that the names of ‘bound’ variables in terms really domatter. For
example, using (T⇒I) and (Tfr):
− ∅;∅  λa.λa.a : φ ⇒ φ ⇒ φ is derivable.
− ∅;∅  λa.λa.a : ψ ⇒ φ ⇒ φ is not derivable.
− ∅;∅  λb.λa.a : ψ ⇒ φ ⇒ φ is derivable.
We could ‘solve’ this problemby introducingα-equivalence into the typing rules.We choose not to; itmakes no difference
for the theorems of interest to us.
• Compare (T∀I) with (∀I). a ∈ fa() is intuitively ‘a is not free in any of the assumptions  used to prove
φ’. a ∈ fa(important(	, a:*;
  r)) generalises this to take account of variables of level two and freshness assumptions
on them.
• Compare (a#b) and (a#b′). (a#b) is as in [44]; distinct variables of level one are fresh. In (a#b′)we account for the type
of b. For example:
a : P(c), X : P(c), c : *; a#X  a#X
a:P(c), X:P(c), c:*; a#X  c#X a:P(c), X:P(c), c:*; a#X  c#a
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2.2. Properties of the permutation action
Here, we collect properties of the permutation action which will be useful later.
Lemma 17. If 	  π (Deﬁnition 13) and 	  π ′ then 	  π ◦π ′.
Proof. Routine from the deﬁnitions. 
Lemma 18. π ′·(π·r) ≡ (π ′ ◦π)·r.
Proof. By induction on r.
• The case a. As permutations are a bijection on variables of level one.
• The case π·X . From the deﬁnition of the permutation action.
• The case r′r. We have (π ◦π ′)·r′r ≡ ((π ◦π ′)·r′)((π ◦π ′)·r). By hypothesis, this is equivalent to (π·(π ′·r′))(π·(π ′·r)).
The result follows from the permutation action.
• The case λa.r. We have
π ′·(π·λa.r) ≡ π ′·(λπ(a).(π·r)) ≡ λ((π ′ ◦ π)·a).((π ′ ◦π)·r)
and the result follows.
• The case xf(r). We have (π ◦ π ′)·xf(r) ≡ xf((π ◦ π ′)·r). By hypothesis, this is equivalent to xf(π·(π ′·r)). The result
follows from the permutation action deﬁnition. 
Lemma 19. If 	;
  a#r and 	  π then 	;
  π(a)#π·r.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 	;
  a#r.
• The case (a#b). Suppose a : φ ∈ 	 and b : φ ∈ 	. Since 	  π also π(a) : φ ∈ 	 and π(b) : φ ∈ 	. By (a#b), also
	  π(a)#π(b).
• The case (a#g) is similar.
• The case (a#b′). Suppose a : * ∈ 	 and b : φ ∈ 	 and a ∈ fa(φ). Since 	  π also π(a) : * ∈ 	 and π(b) : π·φ ∈ 	.
By (a#b′), also 	  π(a)#π(b).
• The case (a#λa). 	;
  π(a)#λπ(a).(π·r) always, using (a#λa).
• The case (a#λb). By inductive hypothesis, 	;
  π(a)#π·r and 	;
  π(a)#π·b. By (a#λb) also
	;
  π(a)#λπ(b).(π·r). The result follows.
• The case (a#X). Suppose a#π ′·X is derived using (a#X), so that π ′-1(a)#X ∈ 
. It is a fact that π ′-1(a) = π ◦ π ′-1
(π(a)). The result follows.
• The cases of (a#app) and (a#xf) are no harder. 
Lemma 20. Suppose 	  π. Then φ ∈ important(	;
  r) if and only if π·φ ∈ important(	;
  π·r).
Proof. Suppose 	  π . Suppose φ ∈ important(	;
  r). By deﬁnition a : φ ∈ 	. Since 	  π , also π(a) : π·φ ∈ 	. Also
by deﬁnition, 	;
  a#r. By Lemma 19 	;
  π(a)#π·r.
The argument for π·φ ∈ important(	;
  r) is similar. The result follows. 
Lemma 21. fa(π·φ) = {π(a) | a ∈ fa(φ)}.
Proof. By a routine induction on φ. 
Lemma 22. If a ∈ fa(φ) and b ∈ fa(φ) then (a b)·φ = φ.
Proof. By a routine induction on φ. 
Lemma 23. If 	;
  r : φ and 	  π then 	;
  π·r : π·φ.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 	;
  r : φ.
• The case (Ta*). Suppose a : * ∈ 	. Since 	  π also π(a) : * ∈ 	. The result follows.• The case (Taφ). Suppose a : φ ∈ 	. Since 	  π also π(a) : π·φ ∈ 	. The result follows.
• The case (TX). By a routine calculation on permutations.
• The cases (T⊥E), (T⇒E), and (T⇒I) are routine.
• The case (T∀E). Suppose 	;
  r : ∀a.φ and 	;
  g : *. By inductive hypothesis 	;
  π·r : ∀π(a).π·φ. Since
	;
  g : *, x : * ∈ 	 for every x ∈ fa(g). Since 	  π also π(x) : * ∈ 	 for every x ∈ fa(g). It is a fact that π·(φ[a :=
g]) = (π·φ)[π(a) := π·g]. Using (T∀E) it follows that 	;
  (π·r)(π·g) : (π·φ)[π·a := π·g].
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• The case (T∀I). Suppose 	, a : *;
  r : φ and a ∈ important(	, a : *;
  r). By inductive hypothesis 	, a : *;
 
π·r : π·φ. By Lemma 20 π·a ∈ important(	, a : *;
  π·r). By assumption since 	, a : *  π also π(a) : * ∈ 	, a : *.
The result follows.
• The case (Tfr). Similar to the previous case, using Lemma 19. 
Lemma 24. Suppose 	;
  r : φ. Then if 	;
  a#r then a ∈ fa(φ).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 	;
  r : φ.
• The case (Taφ). There are two cases:
− 	;
  a#b is derived using (a#b). So a : φ, b : φ ∈ 	. By assumption, a ∈ fa(φ), as required.
− 	;
  a#b is derived using (a#b′). So a : *, b : φ ∈ 	 and a ∈ fa(φ).
• The case (TX). 	;
  a#π·Xmust be derived using (a#X). It follows thatπ-1(a)#X ∈ 
. By the side-condition in (TX),
π-1(a) ∈ fa(φ). Therefore, a ∈ fa(π·X).
• The cases of (T⊥E) and (T⇒E) are routine.
• The case (T∀E). 	;
  a#rg : φ[b := g]must be derived using (a#app). Then	;
  a#r and	;
  a#g. By induc-
tive hypothesis a ∈ fa(∀b.φ), and by the structure of (a#g) also a ∈ fa(g). It is then a fact that a ∈ fa(φ[b := g]).
• The case (T∀I). There are two cases.
− The case of 	, a : *;
  λa.r : ∀a.φ. a ∈ fa(∀a.φ) is immediate.− The case of 	, b : *;
  λb.r : ∀b.φ. Since a ∈ fa(φ) if and only if a ∈ fa(∀b.φ).
• The case (Tfr). Immediate, since φ is not changed above and below the line. 
We use Lemma 25much later, in the proof of Theorem 48. We place it here because it ﬁts naturally into the results in this
section.
Lemma 25. Suppose 	;
  r : φ, 	  (a b), 	;
  a#r, and 	;
  b#r. Then 	;
  (a b)·r : φ.
Proof. Suppose 	;
  r : φ, 	  (a b), 	;
  a#r, and 	;
  b#r. By Lemma 23 	;
  (a b)·r : (a b)·φ. By Lemma 24
a ∈ fa(φ) and b ∈ fa(φ). By Lemma 22 	;
  (a b)·r : φ. 
2.3. Level two substitution
The purpose of level two variables X is to be instantiated; they represent ‘unknown parts of the proof’. We now formally
deﬁne this instantiation action:
Deﬁnition 26. Deﬁne a substitution action r[X := t] by:
a[X := t] ≡ a
(π·X)[X := t] ≡ π·t
(π·Y)[X := t] ≡ π·Y
(λa.r)[X := t] ≡ λa.(r[X := t])
(r′r)[X := t] ≡ (r′[X := t])(r[X := t])
xf(r)[X := t] ≡ xf(r[X := t])
Lemma 27. π·(r[X := t]) ≡ (π·r)[X := t].
Proof. By induction on r.
• The case π·(a[X := t]). Since a[X := t] ≡ a and π(a)[X := t] ≡ π(a).
• The case π ′·((π ′·X)[X := t]). π·(π ′·X)[X := t] ≡ π·π ′·t. The result follows from Lemma 18.
• The case π ′·((π ′·X)[Y := t]). (π ′·X)[Y := u] ≡ π ′·X and similarly for (π ◦ π ′)·X . The result follows.
• The case r′r. We have π·((r′r)[X := t]) ≡ (π·(r[X := t]))(π·(r[X := t])). By inductive hypothesis, (π·(r[X := t]))
(π·(r[X := t])) ≡ ((π·r)[X := t])((π·r)[X := t]). The result follows.
• The case λa.r. We have π·((λa.r)[X := t]) ≡ λπ(a).(π·(r[X := t])). By inductive hypothesis, λπ(a).(π·(r[X := t]))
≡ λπ(a).((π·r)[X := t]). The result follows.
• The case xf(r). We have π·(xf(r)[X := t]) ≡ xf(π·(r[X := t])). By inductive hypothesis, xf(π·(r[X := t])) ≡ xf
((π·r)[X := t]). The result follows. 
2.4. Examples
The derivations below type terms representing derivations from Section 1; one is complete, the other incomplete. At
each stage the term being typed represents a (possibly incomplete) natural deduction derivation.Write ‘	;∅  r’ as ‘	  r’.
Write 	 for a : A, p : A ⇒ B ⇒ C, q : A ⇒ B:
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(Taφ)
	  a : A (Taφ)	  q : A ⇒ B
(T⇒E)
	  qa : B
(Taφ)
	  a : A (Taφ)	  p : A ⇒ B ⇒ C
(T⇒E)
	  pa : B ⇒ C
(Ty⇒E)
	  (pa)qa : C
(T⇒I)
	  λa.((pa)qa) : A ⇒ C
(Tfr)
p : A ⇒ B ⇒ C, q : A ⇒ B  λa.((pa)qa) : A ⇒ C
(Taφ)
	, X : B  X : B
(Taφ)
	, X : B  a : A (Taφ)	, X : B  p : A ⇒ B ⇒ C
(T⇒E)
	, X : B  pa : B ⇒ C
(T⇒E)
	, X : B  (pa)X : C
(T⇒I)
	, X : B  λa.((pa)X) : A ⇒ C
(Tfr)
p : A ⇒ B ⇒ C, q : A ⇒ B, X : B  λa.((pa)X) : A ⇒ C
Derivations of 	  a#λa.((pa)qa) and 	, X : B  a#λa.((pa)X) are elided.
Another example illustrates the side-condition on (T∀I). The two derivations
A
∀c.(A ⇒ P(c))
(∀E)
A ⇒ P(c)
(⇒E)
P(c)
(∀I)∀c.P(c) (∀c.P(c)) ⇒ B
(⇒E)
B
··· X∀c.P(c) (∀c.P(c)) ⇒ B
(⇒E)
B
(2)
are represented, writing 	 for a : A, p : ∀c.(A ⇒ P(c)), q : (∀c.P(c)) ⇒ B, c : *, by:
(Taφ)
	  a:A
(Taφ)
	  p : ∀c.(A⇒P(c))
(T∀E)
	  pc : A⇒P(c)
(T⇒E)
	  pca : P(c)
(
c ∈fa(A),
c ∈fa(∀c.(A⇒P(c)))
(T∀I)
	  λc.(pca) : ∀c.P(c) (Taφ)	  q : (∀c.P(c))⇒B
(T⇒E)
	  q(λc.(pca)) : B
(Tfr)
a : A, p : ∀c.(A ⇒ P(c)), q : (∀c.P(c)) ⇒ B  q(λc.(pca)) : B
(TX)
	, X : P(c)  X : P(c)
(
c ∈ fa(A)
c ∈ fa(∀c.(A⇒P(c)))
c ∈ fa((∀c.P(c))⇒B)))
(T∀I)
	, X : P(c)  λc.X : ∀c.P(c) (Taφ)	, X : P(c)  q : (∀c.P(c))⇒B
(T⇒E)
	, X : P(c)  q(λc.X) : B
(Tfr)
a : A, p : ∀c.(A ⇒ P(c)), q : (∀c.P(c)) ⇒ B, X : P(c)  q(λc.X) : B
Derivations of freshnesses are elided.
3. Admissible rules
Deﬁnition 28. Say that a derivation rule:
A1 . . . An
B
is admissible if A1 . . . An is derivable implies that B is derivable.
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Fig. 3. Admissible rules.
Deﬁnition 29. Write unkn(	) for the variables of level two mentioned in 	.
Deﬁnition 30. Fig. 3 presents three admissible rules: two kinds of weakening, (WeakX) and (Weaka), and a form of Cut.
We brieﬂy outline the meaning of these rules, notation and deﬁnitions follow:
• Weakening for variables of level two (WeakX) is the technically easiest result (Theorem 32). This is the usual weakening
result for natural deduction. Intuitively, we introduce a new unknown derivation, represented by a variable of level two
(but never use it).
• Weakening for variables of level one (Weaka) is technically harder (Theorem 33); what is it to weaken a derivation with
an extra assumption (represented by a variable of level one) that is never used — if we do not yet know all parts of that
derivation? We use freshness conditions.
• Cut is technically themost challenging, and intuitively themost signiﬁcant result (Theorem36).Here,Cutmeans intuitively
that instantiating unknown parts of a derivation results in another derivation; in other words, it is sound to instantiate
variables of level two.
3.1. Weaken with a variable of level two (WeakX)
Lemma 31. Suppose 	′ satisﬁes Deﬁnition 6. Suppose also that 	 ⊆ 	′ and 
 ⊆ 
′.
If 	;
  a#r then 	′;
′  a#r.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 	;
  a#r.
• The case (a#b). Suppose a : φ ∈ 	 and b : φ ∈ 	. Then a : φ ∈ 	′ and b : φ ∈ 	′. Applying (a#b), we obtain 	′;
′ 
a#b. The result follows.
• The case (a#b′). Suppose a : * ∈ 	 and b : φ ∈ 	, with a ∈ fa(φ). Then a : * ∈ 	′ and b : φ ∈ 	′. Applying (a#b′), we
obtain 	′;
′  a#b. The result follows.
• The case (a#g) is immediate.
• The case (a#X). Suppose π-1(a)#X ∈ 
, therefore π-1(a)#X ∈ 
′. Applying (a#X), we obtain 	′;
′  a#π·X . The
result follows.
• The case (a#λa). Since 	′;
′  a#λa.r always, by (a#λa).
• The case (a#λb). By inductivehypothesis,	′;
′  a#r and	′;
′  a#b. Applying (a#λb),weobtain	′;
′  a#λb.r.
The result follows.
• The case (a#app). By inductive hypothesis, 	′;
′  a#r′ and 	′;
′  a#r. Applying (a#app), we obtain 	′;
′ 
a#r′r. The result follows.
• The case (a#xf). By inductive hypothesis, 	′;
′  a#r. Applying (a#xf), we obtain 	′;
′  a#xf(r). The result
follows. 
Theorem 32. (WeakX) is admissible (Fig. 3).
Proof. By induction on derivations.
• The case (Ta*). There is nothing to prove.• The case (Taφ). By assumption, 	;
  a : φ therefore a : φ ∈ 	, hence a : φ ∈ 	, Y : ψ . The result follows.
• The case (TX). By assumption, 	;
  X : φ therefore X : φ ∈ 	, hence X : φ ∈ 	, Y : ψ . Note that 	  π by assump-
tion. The result follows.
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• The case (T⊥E). By inductive hypothesis, 	, Y : ψ;
  r : ⊥ where Y ∈ 	. Applying (T⊥E), we have 	, Y : ψ;
 
xf(r) : φ. The result follows.
• The case (T⇒I). By inductive hypothesis, 	, a : φ, Z : ξ ;
  r : ψ . Applying (T⇒I), we obtain 	, Z : ξ ;
  λa.r :
φ ⇒ ψ . The result follows.
• The case (T⇒E). By inductive hypothesis, 	, Z : ξ ;
  r′ : φ ⇒ ψ and 	, Z : ξ ;
  r : φ with Z ∈	. Applying
(T⇒E), we obtain 	, Z : ξ ;
  r′r : ψ . The result follows.
• The case (T∀I). By inductive hypothesis, 	, a : *, Y : ψ;
  r : φ with Y ∈ 	 where it is easy to see
a ∈ fa(important(	, a : *, Y : ψ;
  r))when a ∈ fa(important(	, a : *;
  r)) and Y ∈ 	. Applying (T∀I), we obtain
	, a : *, Y : ψ;
  λa.r : ∀a.φ. The result follows.• The case (T∀E). By inductive hypothesis, 	, Y : ψ;
  r : ∀a.φ with Y ∈ 	. Applying (T∀E), we obtain 	, Y : ψ;
 
rg : φ[a := g]. The result follows.
• Thecase (Tfr). By inductivehypothesis,	, b : τ , Z : ξ ;
, b#X  r : φ whereZ ∈ 	,τ ∈{ψ , *}andb ∈ 
. By Lemma31,
we have 	, b : τ , Z : ξ ;
, b#X  b#r. Applying (Tfr), we obtain 	, Z : ξ ;
  r : φ. The result follows. 
3.2. Weaken with a variable of level one (Weaka)
(Weaka) states that the variable of level one is fresh for the incomplete parts in the derivation:
Theorem 33. (Weaka) is an admissible rule (Fig. 3).
Proof. By induction on derivations.
• The case (Ta*). There is nothing to prove.• The case (Taφ). Suppose 	;
  a : φ then a : φ ∈ 	. Further, suppose b ∈ 	 and b : τ for τ ∈ {ψ , *}. Then 	, b :
τ ;
, b#unkn(	)  a : φ is derivable. The result follows.
• The case (TX). Suppose 	;
  X : φ then X : φ ∈ 	. Further, suppose b ∈ 	 and b : τ for τ ∈ {ψ , *}. Then 	, b :
τ ;
, b#unkn(	)  X : φ is derivable, and by assumption 	  π . The result follows.
• The case (T⊥E). By inductive hypothesis,	, b : τ ;
, b#unkn(	)  r : ⊥ for τ ∈ {φ, *} and b ∈ 	. Applying (T⊥E), we
obtain 	, b : τ ;
, b#unkn(	)  xf(r) : φ. The result follows.
• The case (T⇒I). By inductive hypothesis,	, a : φ, b : τ ;
, unkn(	)  r : φ for τ ∈ {ψ , *} and b ∈ 	. Applying (T⇒I),
we obtain 	, a : φ, b : τ ;
, b#unkn(	)  λa.r : φ ⇒ ψ . The result follows.
• The case (T⇒E). By inductive hypothesis,	, b : τ ;
, b#unkn(	)  r′ : φ ⇒ ψ and	, b : τ ;
, b#unkn(	)  r : φ for
τ ∈ {φ, *} and b ∈ 	. Applying (T⇒E), we obtain 	, b : τ ;
, b#unkn(	)  r′r : ψ and the result follows.• The case (T∀I). By inductive hypothesis 	, a : *, b : τ ;
, b#unkn(	)  r : φ where b ∈ 	, a : * and τ ∈ {ψ , *}. It is not
hard to calculate that	, a : *, b : τ ;
, b#unkn(	)  b#r andsoa ∈ fa(important(	, a : *, b : τ ;
, b#unkn(	)  r)). The
result follows.
• The case (T∀E). By inductive hypothesis, 	, b : *;
, b#unkn(	)  r : ∀a.φ where b ∈ 	. Applying (T∀E), we obtain
	;
, b#unkn(	)  rg : φ[a := g]. The result follows.
• The case (Tfr). By inductive hypothesis, 	, a : τ , b : τ ′;
, a#X , b#unkn(	, a : τ)  r : φ where τ , τ ′ ∈ {φ, *} and b ∈
	. By Lemmas 31, 	, a : τ , b : τ ′;
, a#X , b#unkn(	, a : τ)  b#r. Applying (Tfr) it is easy to see that unkn(	) =
unkn(	, a : τ) and we therefore obtain 	, b : τ ′;
, b#unkn(	)  r : φ. The result follows. 
3.3. Cut
Themain result of this section is Theorem36, that (Cut) from Fig. 3 is admissible. The proof is non-trivial, and as discussed
at the start of this Section, it is signiﬁcant: it states that level two variables may be instantiated, in other words, that the
‘holes’ in our incomplete derivations really can be ﬁlled with derivations.
The proof of Theorem 36 depends on two lemmas: Lemma 34 and Lemma 35. Recall that important(	;
  r : φ)
(Deﬁnition 14) represents “the possible assumptions of instantiations of r”. Lemma 34 captures this, by proving that the
instantiations of r do have assumptions contained in important(	;
  r : φ); this is important tomake sure that it is sound
to instantiate level two variables in (T∀I). Lemma 35 is themeat of the proof of Theorem 36. It states a precise sense inwhich
instantiating level two variables is sound.
Lemma 34. Suppose that:
• 	, Y : ψ;
  r : φ and 	;
  u : ψ.
• 	;
′  a#u for every a#Y ∈ 
.
(Here, 
′ is any freshness context satisfying the above condition.)
Then
important(	;
′  r[Y := u]) ⊆ important(	, Y : ψ;
  r).
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Proof. By a routine induction on r. We consider cases:
• The case a. Note a[Y := u] ≡ a. Then important(	;
′  a) ⊆ important(	, Y : ψ;
  a). The result follows.
• The case π·Y . We have important(	;
′  π·u) = {φ | a : φ ∈ 	,	;
′  a#π·u}. This is equivalent to {φ | a : φ ∈
	,	;
′  π-1(a)#u}.
Further, we have important(	, Y : ψ;
  π·Y) = {φ | a : φ ∈ 	,	, Y : ψ;
  a#π·Y}. This, in turn, is equivalent to
{φ | a : φ ∈ 	,π-1(a)#Y ∈ 
}.
Now,wemust show {φ | a : φ ∈ 	,	;
′  π-1(a)#u} ⊆ {φ | a : φ ∈ 	,π-1(a)#Y ∈ 
}. So, supposeφ ∈ {φ | a : φ ∈
	,	;
′  π-1(a)#u}, and therefore φ is the type of some variable of level one in 	 such that 	;
′  π-1(a)#u. By
assumption, π-1(a)#Y ∈ 
 implies 	;
′  π-1(a)#u, therefore 	;
′  π-1(a)#u implies π-1(a)#Y ∈ 
. The result
follows.
• The case π·X . Note that (π·X)[Y := s] ≡ π·X . Further, note π-1(a)#X ∈ 
′. It is then easy to see that
important(	;
′  π·X) ⊆ important(	, Y : ψ;
  π·X). The result follows.
• The case λb.r. By inductive hypothesis, important(	;
′  r[Y := u]) ⊆ important(	, Y : ψ;
  r). Note that
(λb.r)[Y := u] ≡ λb.(r[Y := u]). The result follows.
• The case r′r. Note that (r′r)[Y := u] ≡ r′[Y := u](r[Y := u]). The result follows from the inductive hypothesis.
• The case xf(r). Note that xf(r)[Y := u] ≡ xf(r[Y := u]). The result follows from the inductive hypothesis. 
Lemma 35. Suppose that:
• 	, Y : ψ;
  r : φ and 	;
  u : ψ.
• 	;
′  a#u for every a#Y ∈ 
.
Then:
• 	, Y : ψ;
  a#r implies 	;
′  a#r[Y := u], for every a.
• 	;
′  r[Y := u] : φ.
Proof. The ﬁrst claim is shown by induction on the derivation of 	;
′  a#t.
• The case (a#b). Suppose 	, a : φ, b : φ, Y : ψ;
  a#b is derived using (a#b). Then 	, a : φ, b : φ;
′  a#b and
b[Y := u] ≡ b. The result follows.
• The case (a#b′). Suppose 	, a : *, b : φ, Y : ψ;
  a#b is derived by (a#b′). Then a ∈ fa(φ) and it follows that 	, a :
*, b : φ;
′  a#b and b[Y := u] ≡ b. The result follows.• The case (a#g). Suppose 	, Y : ψ;
  a#g is derived using (a#g). Then 	;
′  a#g and g[Y := u] ≡ g. The result
follows.
• The case (a#X). There are two cases:
− The case π·Y . Suppose 	, Y : ψ;
  a#π·Y is derived using (a#X). This implies π-1(a)#Y ∈ 
 by inversion. By
assumption, 	;
′  π-1(a)#u. From Lemma 19 and Lemma 18 we have 	;
′  a#π·u. The result follows.
− The case π·X . Suppose 	, X : φ;
  a#π·X is derived using (a#X). This implies π-1(a)#X ∈ 
. By assumption,
	;
′  π-1(a)#u. By Lemma 19, Lemma 18, and the fact that (π·X)[Y := u] ≡ π·X , the result follows.
• The case (a#λa). Note 	;
′  a#λa.(r[Y := u]) always, using (a#λa). Since λa.(r[Y := u]) ≡ (λa.r)[Y := u], the
result follows.
• The case (a#λb). Suppose	, Y : ψ;
  a#r and	, Y : ψ;
  a#b and	, Y : ψ;
  a#λb.r is derived by (a#λb). By
inductive hypothesis 	;
′  a#r[Y := u] and 	;
′  a#b and so 	;
′  a#λb.(r[X := t]). Since λb.(r[Y := u]) ≡
(λb.r)[Y := u], the result follows.
• The case (a#app). By inductive hypothesis, 	;
′  a#r′[Y := u] and 	;
′  a#r[Y := u]. Applying (a#app), we
obtain 	;
′  a#r′[Y := u](r[Y := u]). Note that r′[Y := u](r[Y := u]) ≡ (r′r)[Y := u]. The result follows.
• The case (a#xf). By inductive hypothesis, 	;
′  a#r[Y := u]. Applying (a#xf), we obtain 	;
′  a#xf(r[Y := u]).
Note that xf(r[Y := u]) ≡ xf(r)[Y := u]. The result follows.
The second claim is shown by induction on the derivation of 	, Y : ψ;
  r : φ.
• The case (Ta*). There is nothing to prove.• The case (Taφ). Suppose a : φ ∈ 	 and 	, Y : ψ;
  a : φ is derived by (Taφ). Then 	;
′  a : φ. Since
a ≡ a[Y := u], the result follows.
• Thecase (TX). SupposeX : φ ∈ 	 and	, Y : ψ;
  X : φ is derivedby (TX). Then	;
′  X : φ. SinceX ≡ X[Y := u],
the result follows. Further, suppose 	, Y : ψ;
  Y : ψ is derived by (TX). By assumption 	;
′  u : ψ . Since
u ≡ Y[Y := u], the result follows.
• The case (T⊥E). By inductive hypothesis,	;
′  r[X := t] : ⊥. Applying (T⊥E), we obtain	;
′  xf(r[X := t]) : φ.
The result follows.
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• The case (T⇒I). By inductive hypothesis, 	, a : φ;
′  r[X := t] : ψ . Applying (T⇒I), we obtain 	, a : φ;
′  λa.
(r[X := t]) : φ ⇒ ψ . As λa.(r[X := t]) ≡ (λa.r)[X := t], the result follows.
• The case (T⇒E). By inductive hypothesis, 	;
′  r′[X := t] : φ ⇒ ψ and 	;
′  r[X := t] : φ. Applying (T⇒E),
we obtain 	;
′  (r′[X := t])(r[X := t]) : ψ . As (r′[X := t])(r[X := t]) ≡ (r′r)[X := t], the result follows.
• The case (T∀E). By inductive hypothesis, 	;
′  r[X := t] : ∀a.φ. Applying (T∀E), we obtain 	;
′  r[X := t]g :
φ[a := g]. As r[X := t]g ≡ (rg)[X := t], the result follows.
• The case (T∀I). By inductive hypothesis, 	, a : *;
′  r[X := t] : φ. Using Lemma 34, a ∈ fa(important(	, a : *;
′ 
r[X := t])). Applying (T∀I), we have	, a : *;
′  λa.(r[X := t]) : ∀a.φ. As λa.(r[X := t]) ≡ (λa.r)[X := t], the result
follows.
• The case (Tfr). Suppose 	, Z : ξ ;
  r : φ because 	, b : τ , Z : ξ ; 
, b#X  r : φ and 	;
  v : ξ and suppose
that 	, b : τ , Z : ξ ; 
, b#X  b#r where b ∈ 
 and τ ∈ {ξ , *}. By inductive hypothesis and some calculations, using
the ﬁrst claim,	, b : τ ; 
′, b#X ′  r[Z := v] : φ and	, b : τ ; 
′, b#X ′  b#r[Z := v] for a suitableX ′ and
′ where
b ∈ 
′. The result follows. 
Cut in natural deduction is the operation of ‘plugging the conclusion of one derivation into the assumption(s) of another’.
Yet, for us now, these derivations may be incomplete and substitution capture-avoiding. The rule (Cut) speciﬁes precisely
what operation this now is, and we have:
Theorem 36. (Cut) is an admissible rule.
Proof. Suppose, given Y ∈ 
, that 	, Y : ψ;
, a1#Y . . . an#Y  r : φ, 	;
  u : ψ and 	;
  ai#u for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then
clearly 	;
  ai#u for every ai#Y ∈ 
, a1#Y , . . . an#Y . The result now follows immediately from Lemma 35. 
4. Natural deduction
The intended semantics of a term r is ‘an incomplete natural deduction derivation’. In this section, we recap the standard
theory of natural deduction derivations and prove forms of soundness (Theorem 41) and completeness (Theorem 42).
Deﬁnition 37. Call a ﬁnite set of types a (natural deduction) context. Let ,′ range over contexts.
Write  φ whenφ may be derived using the rules in Fig. 2 allowing elements of as assumptions.6 In accordancewith
our convention, side-conditions are in brackets. As is standard, square brackets in (⇒I) denote discharge of assumptions;
note that we may choose to discharge φ zero times (empty discharge).
Lemma 38. If   ψ and  ⊆ ′ then ′  ψ.
Proof. By induction on derivations. The special case where ,φ  φ follows immediately. See Footnote 6 for details.
• The case (⊥E). By inductive hypothesis, ′  ⊥. Applying (⊥E), we obtain ′  φ and the result follows.
• The case (⇒I). By inductive hypothesis, ′,φ  ψ . Applying (⇒I), we obtain ′  φ ⇒ ψ when we discharge, and
the result follows. Alternatively, we obtain ′,φ  φ ⇒ ψ where we discharge zero times, and the result follows.
• The case (⇒E). By inductive hypothesis, ′  φ ⇒ ψ and ′  φ. Applying (⇒E), we obtain ′  ψ and the result
follows.
• The case (∀I). By inductive hypothesis, ′  φ. Picking suitable a we extend with (∀I), to obtain ′  ∀a.φ and the
result follows.
• The case (∀E). By inductive hypothesis, ′  ∀b.φ. Applying (∀E), we obtain ′  φ and the result follows. 
Deﬁnition 39. Call 	;
  r closedwhen
 = ∅ and 	 mentions no variables of level two. Recall that we write ‘	;∅  r’
as ‘	  r’.
We will use the following fact without comment.
Lemma 40. If 	  r is closed (so 	 mentions no variables of level two and the freshness context is empty) and 	  r is typable,
then r mentions no variables of level two.
Proof. By induction on derivations.
• The case (Ta*). r ≡ a : *. There is nothing to prove since * is not a type.• The case (Taφ). r ≡ a : φ. The result is immediate.
• The case (TX). Clearly r ≡ X : φ, hence 	  r cannot be closed. There is nothing to prove.
6 Note that in natural deduction,,φ  φ is automatic — ‘if we allow,φ as assumptions, then we assume φ, and so we have φ’. There is no need for a
derivation rule.
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• The case (T⊥E). By inductive hypothesis,	  r : ⊥where	 is closed and r contains no variables of level two. Applying
(T⊥E), we have 	  xf(r) : φ. The result follows.
• The case (T⇒I). By inductive hypothesis, 	, a : φ  r : ψ with 	 closed and r containing no variables of level two.
Applying (T⇒I), we obtain 	  λa.r : φ ⇒ ψ . The result follows.
• The case (T⇒E). By inductive hypothesis, 	  r′ : φ ⇒ ψ and 	  r : φ with 	 closed and r′ and r containing no
variables of level two. Applying (T⇒E), we obtain 	  r′r : ψ . The result follows.
• The case (T∀I). By inductive hypothesis, 	, a : *  r : φ with 	 closed and r containing no variables of level two, where
a satisﬁes the side-condition. Applying (T∀I), we obtain 	  λa.r : ∀a.φ. The result follows.
• The case (T∀E). By inductive hypothesis, we have 	  r : ∀a.φ with 	 closed and r containing no level two variables.
Applying (T∀E), we obtain 	  rg : φ[a := g] and the result follows.
• The case (Tfr). By inductive hypothesis, 	, b : τ  r : φ and 	, b : τ  b#r with r containing no variables of level two
and 	 closed, where τ ∈ {φ, *}. Applying (Tfr), we obtain 	  r : φ. The result follows. 
Theorem 41. Suppose	  r is closedand suppose	  r : φ is derivable.Then important(	  r)  φ (Deﬁnition14) is derivable
in natural deduction.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 	  r : φ.
• The case (Taφ). Suppose 	, a : φ  a : φ. It is then easy to calculate that important(	, a : φ  a) = {φ} and φ  φ is a
fact.
• The case (TX). As 	  r is not closed, there is nothing to prove.
• The case (T⊥E). Suppose 	;
  r : ⊥. By inductive hypothesis, important(	;
  r)  ⊥. Note important(	;
 
r) = important(	;
  xf(r)). Applying (⊥E), we have important(	;
  xf(r))  φ. The result follows.
• The case (T⇒I). Suppose 	, a : φ  λa.r : φ ⇒ ψ and 	, a : φ  r : ψ . By inductive hypothesis, important(	, a : φ 
r)  ψ . We now apply (⇒I). If important(	, a : φ  λa.r) = important(	, a : φ  r)\{φ} then we discharge φ. Other-
wise important(	, a : φ  λa.r) = important(	, a : φ  r) and we discharge φ zero times. The result follows.
• The case of (T⇒E). Suppose 	  r′r : ψ and 	  r′ : φ ⇒ ψ and 	  r : φ. By inductive hypothesis important(	 
r′)  φ ⇒ ψ and important(	  r)  φ. By Lemma 38 and (T⇒E), important(	  r′) ∪ important(	  r)  ψ . By the
syntax-directed nature of the freshness rules in Fig. 1, 	  a#r′r if and only if both of 	  a#r′ and 	  a#r hold.
Therefore, important(	  r′r) = important(	  r′) ∪ important(	  r). The result follows.
• The case (T∀I). Suppose 	, a : *  λa.r : ∀a.φ where 	, a : *  r : φ and a ∈ fa(important(	, a : *  r)). By inductive
hypothesis important(	, a : *  r)  φ. Applying (∀I), important(	, a : *  r)  ∀a.φ. The result follows.• The case (T∀E). Suppose 	  rg : φ[b := g] and 	  r : ∀b.φ. By inductive hypothesis important(	  r)  ∀b.φ. Ap-
plying (∀E), important(	  r)  φ[b := g]. By reasoning similar to the case of (T⇒E) we can calculate that important
(	  rg) = important(	  r). The result follows.
• The case (Tfr). Suppose 	  r : φ and 	, b : τ  r : φ and 	, b : τ  b#r where τ ∈ {φ, *}. By inductive hypothesis
important(	, b : τ  r)  φ. If τ = * then important(	, b : *  r) = important(	  r) and the result follows immedi-
ately. If τ = φ then, since 	, b : φ  b#r again important(	, b : φ  r) = important(	  r). The result follows. 
Theorem 42. If   φ is derivable in natural deduction then there exists some closed 	  r such that important(	  r) ⊆ 
and 	  r : φ.
Proof.We prove by induction on the derivation of   φ that there exists some closed typable 	  r such that:
• important(	  r) ⊆  and 	  r : φ.
• 	 satisﬁes a uniqueness property: if a : φ ∈ 	 and x : φ ∈ 	 then x = a (so there is at most one variable of level one of
each type in 	).7
We consider each possible rule in turn:
• The case of no rule;   φ because φ ∈ . Suppose fa(φ) = {b1, . . . , bn}. We take 	 = a : φ, b1 : *, . . . , bn : * and
r ≡ a. The result follows.
• The case (⊥E). Suppose   ⊥. By inductive hypothesis, there exists 	  r such that important(	  r) ⊆  and 	 
r : ⊥. Applying (T⊥E), we have 	  xf(r) : φ for arbitrary φ. The result follows.
• The case (⇒I). Suppose  φ ⇒ ψ and, φ  ψ . By inductivehypothesis there exists	  r such that important(	 
r) ⊆  ∪ {φ} and	  r : ψ . If a : φ ∈ 	 for some a then let	′ = 	. If no a exists such that a : φ ∈ 	 then let	′ = 	, a :
φ for some a not appearing in 	. By Theorem 33 	′  r : ψ . It is also a fact that important(	  r) = important(	′  r).
Applying (T⇒I) we have 	′  λa.r : φ ⇒ ψ . It is a fact that 	′  a#λa.r. Therefore by uniqueness, important(	′ 
λa.r) = important(	′  r)\{φ}. The result follows.
• The case (⇒E). Suppose  φ ⇒ ψ , and  φ. By inductive hypothesis there exist	′  r′ such that important(	′ 
r′) ⊆  and 	′  r′ : φ ⇒ ψ and 	  r such that important(	  r) ⊆  and 	  r : φ. Without loss of generality
7 Here x ranges over all variables of level one, not necessarily permutatively, so perhaps x = a.
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Fig. 4. Congruence and reduction rules.
we may assume that 	 ∪ 	′ satisﬁes our uniqueness condition; we rename variables of level one to make this true if
necessary. Applying (T⇒E) and using the fact that important(	 ∪ 	′  r′r) ⊆ , the result follows.
• The case (∀I). Suppose   ∀a.φ where a ∈ fa() and   φ. By inductive hypothesis there exists 	  r such that
important(	  r) ⊆  and	  r : φ. Since a ∈ fa()we know that a ∈ fa(important(	  r)). If a : * ∈ 	 then let	′ =
	. Ifa : * ∈ 	 then let	′ = 	, a : *. Ifa : ξ ∈ 	 for sometypeξ thenweare in thepathological situation thata ∈ fa(φ)and
a : ξ ∈ 	 ‘by mistake’; we rename a. By Theorem 33 	′  r : φ. It is also a fact that important(	  r) = important(	′ 
r). Applying (T∀I) and using the fact that important(	′  r) = important(	′  λa.r), tshe result follows.
• The case (∀E). Suppose  φ and  ∀b.φ. By inductivehypothesis there are	 and r such that important(	  r) ⊆ 
and 	  r : ∀b.φ. If 	  g : * then let 	′ = 	. If 	  g : * then let 	′ = 	 ∪ {a : * | a ∈ fa(g)}; we permute atoms in r
and 	 to avoid ‘accidental clash’ with atoms in g; by ZFA equivariance (Appendix A) we retain the inductive hypothesis.
By Theorem 33 	′  r : ∀b.φ. It is also a fact that important(	  r) = important(	′  r). Applying (T∀E) and using the
fact that important(	′  r) = important(	′  rg), the result follows. 
5. Reductions/proof-normalisation
Part of the Curry-Howard correspondence is that reductions correspond with proof-normalisation. Accordingly, we
provide a theory of reductions, hence proof-normalisation, for our syntax:
Deﬁnition 43. Let the derivable reductions 	;
  r → s be inductively deﬁned by the rules in Fig. 4.
Remark 44. Some comments on the rules in Fig. 4:
• (congα) gives us α-equivalence. It is expressed in the style of nominal terms [44] and more speciﬁcally in the style of
the permutation rule of nominal algebra [18]. It is not syntax-directed, but this will not be a problem for our proofs.
• If 	;
  a#π·X holds, then (π·X)[a → t] can reduce in context 	;
 — otherwise, (π·X)[a → t] is simply stuck. In
practice we will freshly extend the context (Deﬁnition 51) and use (congα) to guarantee the side-condition.
• The freshness conditions in (→λa) avoid ‘accidental capture’. Because both a and b could have types, we must avoid
capture not only with respect to t, but also with respect to these types. This is the reason for the a#b and b#a conditions.
This retains subject reduction (Theorem 48) by excluding the possibility that for example a : * ∈ 	 and b : ψ ∈ 	 and
a ∈ fa(ψ).
• We prefer a small-step semantics r → s over a big-step semantics r ⇓ s, because the proof-theorist can view our small
step semantics as directly describing a proof-normalisation algorithm.
Note also that terms need not have any normal form (the ‘canonical form’ of Deﬁnition 57 is not a normal form, but it
serves a similar function), so it is not the case that there is a natural ﬁxed normal form to ‘go to’ in the big step semantics.
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It is possible to identify a normal form up to rearranging substitutions in a suitable sense, but we leave this to future
work, and we do not need it for our proofs.
5.1. Commuting properties of (Tfr)
Given a typing derivation, we may commute all instances of (Tfr) down through the tree, until they reach the root,
in a sense made formal by Theorem 46. We will use this in Section 5.2 to work with typing derivations such that the
non-syntax-directed rule (Tfr) is conveniently isolated at the end of a derivation.
Lemma 45. (Tfr) may be commuted down through all other typing rules (Fig. 1). The transformations involved do not increase
the depth of a derivation.
Proof. By analysing all possibilities.
• The cases (Ta*), (Taφ) and (TX). There is nothing to show.• Suppose (Tfr) is followed by (T⊥E). That is, we have:
	, A;
, b#X  r : ⊥ 	, A;
, b#X  b#r
(Tfr)
	;
  r : ⊥
(T⊥E)
	;
  xf(r) : φ
where A ∈ {b : ψ , b : *} and b ∈ 
. We commute (Tfr)with (T⊥E) to obtain:
	, A;
, b#X  r : ⊥
(T⊥E)
	, A;
, b#X  xf(r) : φ 	, A;
, b#X  b#xf(r)
(Tfr)
	;
  xf(r) : φ
whereA ∈ {b : ψ , b : *}andb ∈ 
. Aswehave	, A;
, b#X  b#r byassumption,wecanderive	, A;
, b#X  b#xf(r)
by (a#xf). The result follows by Lemma 31.
• Suppose (Tfr) is followed by (T⇒E). There are two cases:
− The left case. Assume 	, A;
, b#X  b#r′, which can be guaranteed by ZFA equivariance (Appendix A).
	, A;
, b#X  r′ : φ ⇒ ψ 	, A;
, b#X  b#r′
(Tfr)
	;
  r′ : φ ⇒ ψ 	;
  r : φ
(T⇒E)
	;
  r′r : ψ
where A ∈ {b : ψ , b : *} and b ∈ 
. We commute (Tfr)with (T⇒E) to obtain:
	, A;
, b#X  r′ : φ ⇒ ψ 	, A;
, b#X  r : φ
(Tfr)
	, A;
, b#X  r′r : ψ 	, A;
, b#X  b#r′r
(T⇒E)
	;
  r′r : ψ
where A ∈ {b : ψ , b : *} and b ∈ 
. The result follows.− The right case. Assume 	, A;
, b#X  b#r, which can be guaranteed by ZFA equivariance (Appendix A).
	;
  r′ : φ ⇒ ψ
	, A;
, b#X  r : φ 	, A;
, b#X  b#r
(Tfr)
	;
  r : φ
(T⇒E)
	;
  r′r : ψ
where A ∈ {b : ψ , b : *} and b ∈ 
. We commute (Tfr)with (T⇒E) to obtain:
	, A;
, b#X  r′ : φ ⇒ ψ 	, A;
, b#X  r : φ
(T⇒E)
	, A;
, b#X  r′r : ψ 	, A;
, b#X  b#r′r
(Tfr)
	;
  r′r : ψ
where A ∈ {b : ψ , b : *} and b ∈ 
. The result follows.
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• Suppose (Tfr) is followed by (T⇒I). That is we have:
	, a : φ, A;
, b#X  r : ψ 	, a : φ, A;
, b#X  b#r
(Tfr)
	, a : φ;
  r : ψ
(T⇒I)
	, a : φ;
  λa.r : φ ⇒ ψ
where A ∈ {b : ψ , b : *} and b ∈ 
. Renaming using ZFA equivariance (Appendix A) if necessary, we assume that b ∈
fa(φ). We may commute (Tfr)with (T⇒I) to obtain:
	, a : φ, A;
, b#X  r : ψ
(T⇒I)
	, a : φ, A;
, b#X  λa.r : φ ⇒ ψ 	, a : φ, A;
, b#X  b#λa.r
(Tfr)
	, a : φ;
  λa.r : φ ⇒ ψ
where A ∈ {b : ψ , b : *} and for some b ∈ 
. Then, by assumption, 	, a : φ, A;
, b#X  b#r therefore 	, a : φ, A;
,
b#X  b#λa.r by (a#λb). The result now follows from Lemma 31. The case for
	, a : φ, A;
, a#X  r : ψ 	, a : φ, A;
, a#X  a#r
(Tfr)
	, a : φ;
  r : ψ
(T⇒I)
	, a : φ;
  λa.r : φ ⇒ ψ
where A ∈ {a : φ, a : *} and for some a ∈ 
, follows immediately, using Lemma 31, as a#λa.r always, by (a#λa).• Suppose (Tfr) is followed by (T∀I). That is we have:
	, a : *, A;
, b#X  r : φ 	, a : *, A;
, b#X  b#r
(Tfr)
	, a : *;
  r : φ
(T∀I)
	, a : *;
  λa.r : ∀a.φ
where A ∈ {b : ψ , b : *}, b ∈ 
 and a ∈ fa(important(	, a : *;
  r)). We may commute (Tfr)with (T∀I) to obtain:
	, a : *, A;
, b#X  r : φ
(T∀I)
	, a : *, A;
, b#X  λa.r : ∀a.φ 	, a : *, A;
, b#X  b#λa.r
(Tfr)
	, a : *;
  λa.r : ∀a.φ
where A ∈ {b : ψ , b : *}, b ∈ 
 and by assumption, a ∈ fa(important(	, a : *;
  r)). The result follows.• Suppose (Tfr) is followed by (T∀E). That is, we have:
	, A;
, b#X  r : ∀a.φ 	, A;
, b#X  b#r
(Tfr)
	;
  r : ∀a.φ
(T∀E)
	;
  rg : φ[a := g]
where A ∈ {b : ξ , b : *} and b ∈ 
. Renaming if necessary, we suppose that a and b are distinct. Also permuting if
necessary, we suppose that b ∈ fa(g); we use ZFA equivariance (Appendix A) to retain the inductive hypothesis. We
commute (Tfr)with (T∀E) to obtain:
	, A;
, b#X  r : ∀a.φ
(T∀E)
	, A;
, b#X  rg : φ[a := g] 	, A;
, b#X  b#rg
(Tfr)
	;
  rg : r[a := g]
where A ∈ {b : ξ , b : *} and b ∈ 
. As	, A;
, b#X  b#r, we can derive	, A;
, b#X  b#rg using (a#app). The result
follows by Lemma 31. 
Theorem 46. Suppose  is a derivation of 	;
  r : φ. Then there exists a derivation ′, also of 	;
  r : φ, such that ′
ends in some (possibly zero many) instances of (Tfr), and contains no other instances of (Tfr).
In words: “all instances of (Tfr) may be pushed to the conclusion of the typing derivation”.
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Proof. By Lemma 45. 
5.2. Subject reduction
In this section we investigate three forms of consistency under reduction. Lemma 47 states that ‘no variables are created’
by reductions; in the terminology of [12, Section 6] we can say that reduction is uniform. Theorem 48 is a subject-reduction
property; if we reduce a derivation of a proposition, then it remains a derivation of that same proposition. In the proof of
Theorem 48, we induct on the derivation of a reduction r → s and perform case analysis on the way in which r : φ can have
been derived; the results of Section 5.1 are needed here, to control the non-syntax-directed rule (Tfr).
Lemma49 is an object-level equivarianceproperty; reduction is preservedunder permuting variables of level one (compare
this with [12, Theorem 50, part 3]). Lemma 49 is technically important in Section 5.3 for Lemma 61, which is the key result
for conﬂuence (Theorem 62).
Lemma 47. If 	;
  a#r and 	;
  r → s then 	;
  a#s.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 	;
  r → s.
• The case (→1a). There are two cases:
− The case a[a → t]. We have 	;
  a[a → t] → t and 	;
  a#(λa.a)t. This implies that 	;
  a#λa.a and
	;
  a#t. The result follows.
− The case b[b → u]. We have 	;
  b[b → u] → u and 	;
  a#(λb.b)u. This implies that 	;
  a#λb.b and
	;
  a#u. The result follows.
• The case (→g). We have 	;
  g′[a → g] → g′[a := g]. It is a fact that fa(g′[a → g]) ⊆ fa(g′[a := g]). The result
follows.
• The case (→#)where 	;
  a#r. There are two cases:
− The case a#r[a → t]. The result follows by assumption.
− The case b#r[a → t]. We have 	;
  b#(λa.r)t hence 	;
  b#r and 	;
  b#t. The result follows from the
fact that 	;
  r[a → t] → r.
• The case (→app). There are two cases:
− The case (r′r)[a → t]. We have	;
  (r′r)[a → t] → r′[a → t](r[a → t]) and by assumption,	;
  a#t. Note
that 	;
  a#λa.r′ 	;
  a#λa.r and 	;
  a#t. The result follows.
− The case 	;
  (r′r)[b → u]. We have 	;
  (r′r)[b → u] → r′[b → u](r[b → u]) and 	;
  a#(r′r)[b →
u]. This implies that 	;
  a#λb.(r′r) therefore 	;
  a#r′ and 	;
  a#r and also that 	;
  a#u. With these
facts, we may derive 	;
  a#((λb.r′)u)((λb.r)u). The result follows.
• The case (→λa). There are several cases:
− The case (λb.r)[a → t] where 	;
  b#t, 	;
  b#a, and 	;
  a#b. We have 	;
  (λb.r)[a → t] → λb.
(r[a → t]) and 	;
  a#(λa.(λb.r))t. This implies that 	;
  a#λa.(λb.r) and 	;
  a#t. With this, 	;
 
a#λb.((λa.r)t). The result follows.
− The case (λb.r)[c → v] where 	;
  b#v, 	;
  b#c, and 	;
  c#b. We have 	;
  (λb.r)[c → v] → λb.
(r[c → v]) and	;
  a#(λc.(λb.r))v. This implies that	;
  a#λc.(λb.r) therefore	;
  a#r and also	;
 
a#v. With these facts, we may derive 	;
  a#λb.((λc.r)v). The result follows.
− The case (λa.r)[b → u] where 	;
  a#u, 	;
  b#a, and 	;
  a#b. We have 	;
  (λa.r)[b → u] → λa.
(r[b → u]). It is a fact that 	;
  a#λa.(r[b → u]) always. The result follows.
• The case (→xf). There are two cases:
− The case xf(r)[a → t]. We have 	;
  xf(r)[a → t] → xf(r[a → t]) and 	;
  a#λa.(xf(r))t. This implies that
	;
  a#λa.(xf(r)) and 	;
  a#t. With this, we may derive 	;
  a#xf((λa.r)t). The result follows.
− The case xf(r)[b → u]. We have	;
  xf(r)[b → u] → xf(r[b → u]) and	;
  a#λb.(xf(r))u. This implies that
	;
  a#λb.(xf(r)) therefore 	;
  a#r and 	;
  a#u. With these facts, we may derive 	;
  a#xf((λb.r)u).
The result follows.
• The case (congλa). There is only a one case, as 	;
  a#λa.s always. Therefore, consider 	;
  a#λb.r. This implies
	;
  a#r. By inductive hypothesis 	;
  a#r implies 	;
  a#s. Therefore 	;
  a#λb.s. The result follows.
• The case (congapp1). By assumption,	;
  a#rt. This implies that	;
  a#r and	;
  a#t. By inductive hypoth-
esis, 	;
  a#r implies 	;
  a#s. Therefore, 	;
  a#st. The result follows.
• The case (congapp2) is similar to the previous case.
• The case (congxf). By assumption, 	;
  a#xf(r) therefore 	;
  a#r. By inductive hypothesis, 	;
  a#r implies
	;
  a#s. Therefore, 	;
  a#xf(s). The result follows.
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• The case (congα). By assumption, 	;
  b#s, 	;
  c#s and 	;
  a#r. By inductive hypothesis, 	;
  a#s. By
Lemma 19, we have 	;
  a#(b c)·s. The result follows. 
Theorem 48 (Subject reduction). If 	;
  r : φ and 	;
  r → s then 	;
  s : φ.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 	;
  r → s. In a sense illustrated in the case of (→1a), we may conveniently
ignore (Tfr).
• The case (→1a). Suppose 	;
  a[a → t] → t. By deﬁnition a[a → t] ≡ (λa.a)t. Suppose 	;
  (λa.a)t : φ. By
Theorem 46 there is a derivation of 	;
  (λa.a)t : φ such that all instances of (Tfr) occur at the end of the derivation.
Therefore, for some 	′ and 
′ extending 	 and 
, 	′;
′  λa.a : φ ⇒ φ and 	′;
′  t : φ. Using Lemma 47 (or by
concrete calculations) we can now extend the derivation of 	′;
′  t : φ to a derivation of 	;
  t : φ, as required.
From now on, we will elide the treatment of (Tfr), which is identical in all the following cases.
• The case (→g). Suppose	;
  g′[a → g] → g[a := g]. It is a fact that fa(g′[a := g]) ⊆ fa(g′[a → g]). It follows that
if 	;
  g′[a → g] : * then 	;
  g′[a := g] : *.• The case (→#)where	;
  a#r. Suppose	;
  r[a → t] → r. By deﬁnition r[a → t] ≡ (λa.r)t. Suppose	;
 
(λa.r)t : φ. There are now two cases:
− a : φ′ ∈ 	 and 	;
  r : φ and 	;
  t : φ′.
− a : * ∈ 	 and 	;
  r : φ and 	;
  t : *.
In either case, 	;
  r : φ.
• The case (→app). Suppose 	;
  (r′r)[a → t] → (r′[a → t])(r[a → t]). By deﬁnition (r′r)[a → t] ≡ (λa.(r′r))t
and (r′[a → t])(r[a → t]) ≡ ((λa.r′)t)((λa.r)t). There are now four cases:
− 	;
  (λa.(r′r))t : φ because a : ψ ∈ 	, 	;
  t : ψ , 	;
  r′ : φ′ ⇒ φ, and 	;
  r : φ′ ∈ 	.
− 	;
  (λa.(r′r))t : φ[a := t] because a : * ∈ 	, 	;
  t : *, 	;
  r′ : φ′ ⇒ φ, and 	;
  r : φ′ ∈ 	.− (λa.(r′r))t : φ[b := r] because a : ψ , 	;
  t : ψ , 	;
  r′ : ∀b.φ, and 	;
  r : *.− (λa.(r′r))t : φ[b := r][a := t] because a : * ∈ 	, 	;
  t : *, 	;
  r′ : ∀b.φ, and 	;
  r : *.
In each case, it is routine to verify the result. For example in the ﬁnal case, it is routine to verify that 	;
  ((λa.r′)t)
((λa.r)t) : φ[b := r][a := t] as required.
• The case (→λa). Suppose 	;
  (λb.r)[a → t] → λb.(r[a → t]) where 	;
  b#t, 	;
  b#a, and 	;
  a#b.
By deﬁnition (λb.r)[a → t] ≡ (λa.(λb.r))t and λb.(r[a → t]) ≡ λb.((λa.r)t). There are now two cases:
− 	;
  (λa.(λb.r))t : φ′ ⇒ φ because a : ψ , b : φ′ ∈ 	, 	;
  t : ψ , and 	;
  r : φ.
− 	;
  (λa.(λb.r))t : (φ′ ⇒ φ)[a := t] because a : *, b : φ′ ∈ 	, 	;
  t : *, and 	;
  r : φ.− 	;
  (λa.(λb.r))t : ∀b.φ because a : ψ , b : * ∈ 	, 	;
  t : ψ , and 	;
  r : φ.− 	;
  (λa.(λb.r))t : (∀b.φ)[a := t] because a : *, b : * ∈ 	, 	;
  t : *, and 	;
  r : φ.
In each case, it is routine to verify the result. For example in the ﬁnal case, that 	;
  λb.((λa.r)t) : ∀b.(φ[a := t]).
• Thecase (→xf). Suppose	;
  xf(r)[a → t] : φ. Bydeﬁnitionxf(r)[a → t] ≡ (λa.(xf(r)))t. Therearenowtwocases:
− 	;
  (λa.(xf(r)))t : ⊥ because a : ψ ∈ 	 and 	;
  r : φ.
− 	;
  (λa.(xf(r)))t : ⊥ because a : * ∈ 	 and 	;
  r : φ.
In each case, it is routine to verify the result. For example in the ﬁrst case, that 	;
  xf(r) : ⊥.
• The case (congα). Suppose	;
  r : φ, Suppose	;
  (a b) and	;
  a#r and	;
  b#r. Since	;
  r → s,
by inductive hypothesis 	;
  s : φ. By Lemma 47, 	;
  a#s and 	;
  b#s. It follows by Lemma 25 that 	;
 
(a b)·s : φ, as required.
• The case (congλa). Suppose 	;
  r → s and 	;
  λa.r → λa.s. There are now two cases:
− 	;
  λa.r : φ′ ⇒ φ and a : φ′ ∈ 	. By inductive hypothesis 	;
  s : φ. By (T⇒I) 	;
  s : φ′ ⇒ φ.
− 	;
  λa.r : ∀a.φ and a : * ∈ 	. By inductivehypothesis	;
  s : φ. Using Lemma47we see that important(	 
s) ⊆ important(	  r). It follows using (T∀I) that 	;
  λa.s : ∀a.φ.
• The cases of (congapp1), (congapp2), and (congxf) are no harder. 
Lemma 49. If 	;
  r → s then 	;
  π·r → π·s.
Proof. By induction on derivations.
• The case (→1a). We have π·(a[a → t]) ≡ π(a)[π(a) → π·t]. The result follows from (→1a).
• The case (→g) is similar.
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• The case (→#) where 	;
  a#r. We have π·(r[a → t]) ≡ (π·r)[π(a) → π·t]. By Lemma 19, we have 	;
 
π(a)#π·r. Applying (→#), we derive 	;
  (π·r)[π(a) → π·t] → π·r. The result follows.
• The case (→app). We have π·((r′r)[a → t]) ≡ ((π·r′)(π·r))[π(a) → π·t]. Applying (→app), we obtain ((π·r′)
[π(a) → π·t])((π·r)[π(a) → π·t]). The result follows from the deﬁnition of the permutation action.
• The case (→λa) where 	;
  b#t, 	;
  b#a, and 	;
  a#b. We have π·((λb.r)[a → t]) ≡ (λπ(b).(π·r))
[π(a) → π·t]. By Lemma 19, we have 	;
  π(b)#π·t. Applying (→λa), we have 	;
  (λπ(b).(π·r))[π(a) →
π·t] → λπ(b).((π·r)[π(a) → π·t]). The result follows by the deﬁnition of the permutation action.
• The case (→xf). We have π·(xf(r)[a → t]) ≡ xf(π·r)[π(a) → π·t]. Applying (→xf), we have 	;
  xf(π·r)
[π(a) → π·t] → xf((π·r)[π(a) → π·r]). The result follows.
• The case (congapp1). By inductive hypothesis, we have 	;
  π·r → π·s. Applying (congapp1), we have 	;
 
(π·r)(π·t) → (π·s)(π·t). The result follows.
• The case (congapp2) is similar to the previous case.
• The case (congλa). By inductive hypothesis, we have 	;
  π·r → π·s. Applying (congλa), we have
	;
  λπ(a).(π·r) → λπ(a).(π·s). The result follows.
• The case (congxf). By inductive hypothesis, we have	;
  π·r → π·s. Applying (congxf), we have	;
  xf(π·r) →
xf(π·s). The result follows.
• The case (congα). By inductivehypothesis,wehave	;
  π·r → π·s. Further, by Lemma19,wehave	;
  π(a)#π·
s and 	;
  π(b)#π·s. Applying (congα), we obtain 	;
  π·r → (π(a) π(b))·(π·s). The result follows from ele-
mentary properties of permutations. 
5.3. Conﬂuence
The next notion of correctness, following subject reduction discussed in Theorem 48 in Section 5.2, is conﬂuence and the
identiﬁcation of a canonical reduced version of any derivation. This is Deﬁnition 57 and Theorem 62.
Choose some ﬁxed but arbitrary order on variables of level one. If S is a ﬁnite set of variables of level one say ‘for the
ﬁrst variable of level one not in S’ to mean ‘for the least variable of level one, in our ﬁxed but arbitrary order, that is not an
element of S’. This is convenient, though not necessary, for expressing the proofs to follow. We will never make inﬁnitely
many choices of fresh variable of level one, and nowhere will the truth of a result depend on our choice of order.
Deﬁnition 50. Deﬁne a substitution action on terms, with respect to a typing and freshness context, 	;
 by the rules
below. Earlier rules take priority.
• r[a := t] ≡ r if 	;
  a#r.
• a[a := t] ≡ t.
• (π·X)[a := t] ≡ (π·X)[a → t].
• (λb.r)[a := t] ≡ λb.(r[a := t]) if 	;
  b#t, 	;
  a#b, and 	;
  b#a.
• (λb.r)[a := t] ≡ λc.(((b c)·r)[a := t]) if 	;
  b#t. Here c is the ﬁrst fresh variable of level one of the same type as b
in 	 if such a variable exists.
That is, c is the ﬁrst variable of level one, with the same type as b, according to our order, that is not mentioned in r, t, a,
or b (so 	;
  c#r and 	;
  c#t), if such a c exists.
• (r′r)[a := t] ≡ r′[a := t](r[a := t]).
• xf(r)[a := t] ≡ xf(r[a := t]).
Note in Deﬁnition 50 that r[a := t] depends on 	;
 and that r[a := t] need not necessarily exist. This is a partial
deﬁnition; however, we may guarantee that r[a := t] exists for suitably extended versions of 	 and 
.
Deﬁnition 51. Suppose that	;
 and	+;
+ are pairs of typing and freshness contexts. Say	+;
+ freshly extends	;

when there exist 	′ and 
′ such that:
• 	′ gives types to the variables of level one appearing in 
′, and to no other variables of level one (and to no variables of
level two).
• If a#X ∈ 
′ then X is given a type in 	.
• If a#X ∈ 
′ then a does not appear in 	 or 
.
• 
+ = 
 ∪ 
′.
• 	+ = 	 ∪ 	′.
Intuitively, 	+;
+ ‘extends 	;
 with some fresh variables of level one’.
Deﬁnition 52. Deﬁne →* as the reﬂexive, transitive closure of →.
Lemma 53. Suppose that 	 ⊆ 	′ and 
 ⊆ 
′.
If 	;
  r → s then 	′;
′  r → s.
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Proof. By induction on the derivation of 	;
  r → s.
• The case (→1a). Since 	′;
′  a[a → t] → t always, by (→1a).
• The case (→g) is similar.
• The case (→#). Suppose 	;
  a#r. By Lemma 31, 	′;
′  a#r. Then 	′;
′  r[a → t] → r. The result follows.
• The case (→xf). Since 	′;
′  xf(r)[a → t] → xf(r[a → t]) always, by (→xf).
• The case (→λa). Suppose	;
  b#t,	;
  b#a, and	;
  a#b. By Lemma 31,	′;
′  b#t, and similarly for b#a
and a#b. Then 	′;
′  (λb.r)[a → t] → λb.(r[a → t]) always, by (→λa). The result follows.
• The case (→app). Since 	′;
′  (r′r)[a → t] → r′[a → t](r[a → t]) always, by (→app).
• The case (congλa). By inductive hypothesis,	′;
′  r → s. Applying (congλa), we obtain	′;
′  λa.r → λa.s. The
result follows.
• The case (congapp1). By inductive hypothesis,	′;
′  r → s. Applying (congapp1), we obtain	′;
′  rt → st. The
result follows.
• The case (congapp2). By inductive hypothesis, 	′;
′  t → u. Applying (congapp1), we obtain 	′;
′  rt → ru.
The result follows.
• The case (congxf). By inductive hypothesis,	′;
′  r → s. Applying (congxf), we obtain	′;
′  xf(r) → xf(s). The
result follows.
• The case (congα). Suppose 	;
  r → s, with 	;
  a#s, 	;
  b#s and 	  (a b). By inductive hypothesis,
	′;
′  r → s. By Lemma 31, 	′;
′  a#s and 	′;
′  b#s. As 	′ satisﬁes Deﬁnition 6, we have 	′  (a b). Applying
(congα), we obtain 	′;
′  r → (a b)·s. The result follows. 
The following deﬁnition and lemma are used in the proof of Lemma 56.
Deﬁnition 54. Deﬁne the depth of a term by:
depth(a) = 1 depth(π·X) = 1 depth(λa.r) = 1 + depth(r)
depth(r′r) = depth(r′) + depth(r) depth(xf(r)) = 1 + depth(r)
Lemma 55. depth(π·r) = depth(r)
Proof. By induction on r.
• The case a. Since π is a bijection on variables of level one.
• The case π ′·X . By Lemma 18, π·(π ′·X) ≡ (π ◦ π ′)·X . Further, depth((π ◦ π ′)·X) = depth(π ′·X). The result follows.
• The case λa.r. We have π·λa.r ≡ λπ(a).(π·r). By inductive hypothesis, depth(π·r) = depth(r). The result follows.
• The case r′r. By inductive hypothesis, depth(π·r′) = depth(r′) and depth(π·r) = depth(r). The result follows.
• The case xf(r). By inductive hypothesis, depth(π·r) = depth(r). The result follows. 
Lemma 56. For every 	;
, r, a, s and t there exist 	+ freshly extending 	 and 
+ freshly extending 
 such that
	+;
+  r[a → t] →* r[a := t].
(r[a := t] calculated for 	+;
+.)
Proof. By induction on the depth of r.
• The case a. We have a[a := t] ≡ t and also 	;
  a[a → t] →* t.
• The case b. We have b[a := t] ≡ b and also 	;
  b[a → t] →* b.
• Thecaseπ·X . If	;
  a#π·X thenwehave (π·X)[a := t] ≡ π·X and	;
  (π·X)[a → t] →* (π·X)also.Otherwise,
we have 	;
  (π·X)[a → t] →* (π·X)[a → t] and (π·X)[a := t] ≡ (π·X)[a → t]. The result follows.
• The case λa.r. We have (λa.r)[a := t] ≡ λa.r and 	;
  (λa.r)[a → t] →* λa.r.
• The case λb.r. If 	;
  a#λb.r, then (λb.r)[a := t] ≡ λb.r and 	;
  (λb.r)[a → t] → λb.r. Otherwise, there are
two cases:
− The case 	;
  b#t, 	;
  b#a, and 	;
  a#b. We have (λb.r)[a := t] ≡ λb.(r[a := t]). Applying (→λa)
	;
  (λb.r)[a → t] → λb.(r[a → t]). By inductive hypothesis 	+;
+  r[a → t] →* r[a := t] for some 	+
and 
+ freshly extending 	 and 
. The result follows using Lemma 53.
− Otherwise, we have (λb.r)[a := t] ≡ (λc.((b c)·r))[a := t]where c is a suitably fresh variable of level one of suitable
type, obtained from the freshly extended contexts 	+ and 
+. Applying (congα) and (→λa)
	+;
+  (λb.r)[a → t] →* (λc.((b c)·r))[a → t].
By inductive hypothesis and Lemma 55, we have
	+;
+  ((b c)·r)[a → t] →* ((b c)·r)[a := t].
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The result follows.
• The case r′r. If 	;
  a#r′r then the result follows immediately. Otherwise, (r′r)[a := t] ≡ r′[a := t](r[a := t]) and
	;
  (r′r)[a → t] →* r′[a → t](r[a → t]) by (→app). The result follows by the inductive hypothesis for r and r′.
• The case xf(r). We have xf(r)[a := t] ≡ xf(r[a := t]). The result follows by the inductive hypothesis for r. 
Deﬁnition 57. Let the canonical form r of r in the context	;
 be inductively deﬁned by the following rules, where earlier
rules take priority8:
g ≡ g
(π·X) ≡ (π·X)
(λa.r) ≡ λa.r
(r[a → t]) ≡ r[a := t]
(r′r) ≡ (r′)(r) where r′ is not an abstraction
xf(r) ≡ xf(r)
Note that r depends on the context 	;
. It need not be deﬁned, because [a := t] need not always be deﬁned (see
the comment following Deﬁnition 50). However, in a sense made formal by Lemma 58 this does not matter because we can
freshly extend the context.
Note also that (r) ≡ r in general, so taking the canonical form is not idempotent. This will not be a problem. r is
a choice of representative of the terms that r rewrites to; a choice which happens to be very useful for proving conﬂuence
(Theorem 62). Intuitively, r is a rewrite of r such that
“all substitutions have been pushed down, and through each other, at least once”.
Lemma 58. For every 	;
 and r there exist 	+ and 
+ such that 	+;
+  r →* r. (r calculated for 	+;
+.)
Proof. By induction on r.
• The case a. Since a ≡ a.
• The case π·X . Since (π·X) ≡ π·X .
• The case λa.r. By inductive hypothesis, 	+;
+  r →* r. The result follows from λa.(r) ≡ (λa.r).
• Thecase r′r. The special case r[a → t], bydeﬁnition syntactically identical to (λa.r)t, follows fromLemma56.Otherwise,
by inductive hypothesis, 	+;
+  r′ →* r′ and 	+;
+  r →* r. The result follows from r′(r) ≡ (r′r).
• The case xf(r). By inductive hypothesis, 	+;
+  r →* r. The result follows from xf(r) ≡ xf(r). 
For the rest of this section, 	+;
+ will be a context freshly extending 	;
 with sufﬁcient freshness such that all the
canonical forms we require exist. We will always be clear about what these canonical forms are.
Lemma 59. Fix 	;
. Then 	;
  a#s implies 	;
  a#s. (s calculated for 	;
.)
Proof. By induction on derivations.
• The case (a#b). Since b ≡ b.
• The case (a#g). Since g ≡ g.
• The case (a#λa). We have (λa.r) ≡ λa.r and 	;
  a#λa.r always.
• The case (a#λb). By inductive hypothesis,	;
  a#r. Applying (a#λb), we have	;
  a#λb.r. The result follows.
• The case (a#X). As (π·X) ≡ π·X .
• The case (a#b′). Since b ≡ b.
• The case (a#app). By inductive hypothesis, 	;
  a#r′ and 	;
  a#r. Applying (a#app) and simple manipula-
tion, we have 	;
  a#(r′r). The result follows.
• The case (a#xf). By inductive hypothesis, 	;
  a#r. Applying (a#xf) and simple manipulation, we obtain 	;
 
a#xf(r). The result follows. 
Lemma 60. (π·r) ≡ π·r
Proof. By induction on r.
• The case a. Since a ≡ a for all variables of level one.
8 It has been pointed out to us that the technique we use to prove conﬂuence resembles a proof by Makato Takahashi [42]. This ‘convergent evolution’ is
interesting and suggests to us the existence of some deeper mathematics, which we have not fully understood. At the very least, there should be a general
method here which could be brought out.
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• The case π ′·X . We have (π ′·X) ≡ π ′·X . The result follows from Lemma 18.
• The case r′r. We have π·((r′r)) ≡ (π·(r′))(π·(r)). The result follows from the inductive hypothesis.
• The case λa.r. Since (π·λa.r) ≡ (λπ(a).(π·r)) ≡ λπ(a).((π·r)). Applying the inductive hypothesis, we have
λπ(a).((π·r)) ≡ λπ(a).(π·r). The result follows from the deﬁnition of the permutation action.
• The case xf(r). Since (π·xf(r)) ≡ xf(π·r) ≡ xf((π·r)). By application of the inductive hypothesis, xf((π·r)) ≡
xf(π·r). The result follows. 
Lemma 61. 	;
  r → s implies 	+;
+  s →* r.
Proof. By induction on derivations. Note the reversal from r → s to s →* r.
• The case (→1a). We have:
	;
  a[a → t] → t
	+;
+  t →* (a[a → t])
as (a[a → t]) ≡ t and the result follows.
• The case (→g). We have:
	;
  g′[a → g] → g′[a := g]
	+;
+  (g′[a := g]) →* (g′[a → g])
as (g′[a → g]) ≡ g′[a := g] ≡ (g′[a := g]) and the result follows.
• The case (→#)when 	;
  a#r. We have:
	;
  r[a → t] → r
	+;
+  r →* (r[a → t])
as (r[a → t]) ≡ r when 	;
  a#r.
• The case (→λa)when 	;
  b#t, 	;
  a#b, and 	;
  b#a. We have:
	;
  (λb.r)[a → t] → λb.(r[a → t])
	+;
+  (λb.(r[a → t])) →* ((λb.r)[a → t])
as (λb.(r[a → t])) ≡ λb.(r[a := t]) ≡ ((λb.r)[a → t]).
• The case (→xf). We have:
	;
  (xf(r))[a → t] → xf(r[a → t])
	+;
+  (xf(r[a → t])) →* ((xf(r))[a → t])
as (xf(r[a → t])) ≡ (xf(r[a := t])) ≡ ((xf(r))[a → t]).
• The case (congλa). By inductive hypothesis, 	+;
+  s →* r. We now argue by induction on the path length of
	+;
+  s →* r. If the path is empty, then s ≡ r and the result follows. Otherwise, we have the case 	+;
+ 
s →* r′ → r. By inductive hypothesis, it follows that 	+;
+  λa.s →* λa.r′. Applying (congλa), it follows
that 	+;
+  λa.r′ → λa.r. It now follows, by the deﬁnition of the reﬂexive transitive closure, that 	+;
+ 
λa.s →* λa.r. The result follows.
• The case (congapp1). By inductive hypothesis,	+;
+  s →* r. Applying (congapp1) and an inductive argument
similar to the previous case we derive 	+;
+  s(t) →* r(t). The result follows.
• The case (congapp2) is similar to the previous case.
• The case (congxf). By inductive hypothesis,	+;
+  s →* r. By induction on the path length of	+;
+  s →*
r and applying (congxf), the result follows.
• The case (congα). Suppose s ≡ (a b)·s′. Suppose 	;
  r → s′ and 	;
  a#s′ and 	;
  b#s′. By inductive hy-
pothesis, 	+;
+  s′ →* r. By Lemma 59 	+;
+  a#s′ and 	+;
+  b#s′. By Lemma 47 it follows that
	+;
+  a#r and 	+;
+  b#r. Applying (congα) it follows that 	+;
+  s′ →* (a b)·(r). By Lemmas 49
and 18 it follows that 	;
+  (a b)·(s′) →* r. By Lemma 60 	+;
+  s →* r. The result follows. 
Theorem 62. If 	;
  s *← r →* t then 	+;
+  s →* u *← t. That is, → is Church–Rosser.
Proof. Suppose 	;
  r →* s and 	;
  r →* t. By Lemma 58 fresh extensions 	1;
1 of 	;
 exist such that 	1;
1 
r →* r. Again by Lemma 58, fresh extensions 	2;
2 and 	3;
3 of 	;
, exist such that 	2;
2  s →* s and 	3;
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3  t →* t. By Lemma 61 a fresh extension 	4;
4 of 	2;
2, and a fresh extension 	5;
5 of 	3;
3, exist such that
	4;
4  s →* r and 	5;
5  t →* r. Taking 	+ = ⋃1≤i≤5 	i and 
+ = ⋃1≤i≤5 
i, the result follows.
For the reader’s convenience we rewrite this argument as a diagram:
r
* *
s t
s

*
* r

*
ﬀ* t

*

We illustrate this for X[a →t][b →u], where 	;
  a#u:
X[a →t][b →u]
* *
X[a →t][b →u] X[b →u][a →t[b →u]]
X[b →u][a →t[b →u]]
*
* X[b →u][a →t[b →u]]
*
ﬀ* X[a →t[b →u]][b →u[a →t[b →u]]]
*
6. Conclusions
We have shown how nominal terms, endowed with a non-trivial typing system, model incomplete derivations in ﬁrst-
order logic.
Weuse aone-and-a-half level syntaxbuildingon ideas fromone-and-a-halfth order logic [19]: variables of level onemodel
variable symbols and can be quantiﬁed (we use variables of level one to model both type and term variables); variables of
level two model ‘holes’. This reﬂects informal practice in which instantiation of meta-variables (modelled here by variables
of level two) captures object-level abstraction (modelled by variables of level one and their abstraction).
This paper is part of a larger project to develop nominal techniques in general, and in particular to study a multi-level
syntax, in which capturing-substitution is explicitly represented, and using permutations to manage α-conversion in the
presence of multiple levels of variable.
6.1. Related work
This paper builds on a conference version [20]. This journal paper gives full proofs, and it also extends results as follows:
• The type language is now full ﬁrst-order logic, rather than ﬁrst-order logic without term-formers.9
• We have added to the syntax of our Curry-Howard system a theory of α-equivalence, following nominal terms and based
on permutations in the style of [25,44]. This is (congα), andmore speciﬁcally, it is based on the permutation rule (perm)
from nominal algebra [18].
• We have given notions of β-reduction/proof-normalisation.
This paper ‘just’ studies a type system for nominal terms. Has this not been done before? Not in a way that helps us for
constructing Curry-Howard for ﬁrst-order logic. A sorting system for nominal terms from [44] is not suitable; it is designed
to construct abstract syntax and atoms (variables of level one in our terminology) have sort ‘the sort of atoms’, thus they do
not populate other types as do the variables of level one in this paper. A typing system [11] is not suitable, for two reasons:
• Types corresponded with propositional logic with quantiﬁers whereas here, we want ﬁrst-order logic.
• Here, we want to represent (∀I) and (∀E) (Fig. 2) so terms may λ-abstract over and be applied to type variables, and we
require freshness for type variables. In [11] type-variables do not inhabit terms in any way.
A body of research exists, aimed at providing formalisms for representing incomplete derivations:
Muñoz, Asperti . Of all the work we have seen in the literature, that by Muñoz [34] seems closest in spirit to ours. Muñoz
works towards representing incomplete derivations in dependent types — a goal more ambitious than ours, of representing
incomplete derivations of ﬁrst-order logic, but not one which creates any essential difﬁculties aside from problems of scale
and presentation. We believe that what Muñoz tries to do, and what we try to do, are essentially the same thing. The major
difference, which we believe is an advantage of our approach, is our use of nominal terms — Muñoz uses de Bruijn indexes.
The ﬁrst 60 pages of [34] are devoted to discussing the problems, and solutions, of representing reduction in a λ-calculus
9 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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with explicit substitutions based on de Bruijn indexes. Then ‘meta-variables’ (level two variables in our terminology) are
introduced. These are essentially identical to our level two variables and admit a capturing substitution (see Deﬁnition 3.1.7
in [34]) — but they exist in the de Bruijn framework.
The Matita [1] proof assistant, based on the Curry-Howard isomorphism, employs Muñoz’s approach for representing
unspeciﬁed proofs. It would be interesting future work to create a similar proof assistant based on our approach. We hope
this could permit a higher-level style of programming in the sameway that for example FreshOCaml or α-Prolog (also based
on the nominal model of names and binding) are intended to allow a higher-level style of programming on datatypes with
names [39,7]. This is future research.
Jojgov and Geuvers . Jojgov and Geuvers [14] study incomplete derivations in higher-order logic (a popular logic for proof
assistants). Their work may be seen as a generalisation of that of Muñoz, wherein they generalise the approach and re-
establish the Curry-Howard isomorphism, but may also be viewed as a systemization of the techniques used in the Coq and
Matita proof assistants.
They create o-HOL, which conservatively extends HOL with ‘open’ terms and ‘open’ (incomplete) proofs. ‘Metavariables’
(level two variables in our terminology) are represented in o-HOL syntax. Their treatment of α-conversion is not nominal,
but neither is it quite ‘traditional’. In particular it does capture a kind of capturing substitution which they, like us, call
instantiation. See the deﬁnition of metavariable instantiation on page 546 (page 10 of the paper, just after Deﬁnition 11),
which in simpliﬁed form reads like this:
n[q]{n[y] := t} = t[q/y]
Here n is a metavariable symbol, q and t are terms, and y is a (n ordinary, level one) variable. n[q] seems to correspond with
whatwemightwrite as ‘X[− → q]’ and themetavariable instantiation {n[y] := t} seems to correspondwithwhatwemight
write as ‘[y → −][X := t]’. By this (rather ingenious) device Jojgov and Geuvers avoid many of the pitfalls described in [4,
Section 2.1 onwards], [35, Section 1.4.1], and [15, Section 1] of combining (in our terminology) variables of different levels.
The precise technical relationship between our term language and that of Jojgov and Geuvers is currently unclear and
might be the topic of future work.
Miller andMcBride . McBride’s Oleg system [31] is a theorem proving environment, based on Luo’s ECC, augmentedwithwhat
McBride calls ‘holes’, which a Prolog programmer might recognise as ‘logical variables’ or ‘existential variables’. Intuitively,
an existential variable has operational or logical content ‘please ﬁnd a suitable value for me’.10 McBride’s syntax for a
existential variable is ?x.p where p is a term. See Section 2.3 of [31] where rules are presented for searching for values for,
and instantiating values for, existential variables.
If the existential variables represent a datatype of derivation-trees, then terms with existential variables represent in-
complete derivations. There is no a priori proof-theory or reduction system for such a datatype built in to McBride’s system
(it is just a datatype).
McBride’s system comes closer to our goals if we consider that a term containing a existential variable inMcBride’s system
does in a suitable sense represent an ‘incomplete inhabitant’ of the type it populates. If that type is a type of truth-values
then the term represents an ‘incomplete inhabitant’ of a type of truth-values, thus, an ‘incomplete proof’. In fact our level two
variables X are neither overtly existential nor universal.We have given no operational semantics for instantiating them (note
that we have studied instantiation of X — see Deﬁnition 50 and the subsequent results — we just have not internalised this
to, for example, a derivation-instantiating strategy). However, level two variables X exist at top level and we, looking at the
system from the outside, typicallywant to ‘ﬁnd some complete derivation’, i.e. wewant to instantiate X with some term of the
right type. Thus for us, theX do intuitively possess an existential ﬂavour. Then the difference between ourwork andMcBride’s
is our ‘nominal style’ term language;McBride’s treatment of existential variables and instantiation is based on ‘traditional’α-
equivalence and capture-avoiding substitution. Essentially, our work andMcBride’s are two complementary systems; we do
not study existential variables for their own sake (though they do appear in our system to represent ‘unknown derivations’!)
— and McBride does not study instantiation. In that light, our argument is that for Curry-Howard for incomplete derivations
we need logical variables and instantiation. Thus, it might be interesting to take the ideas about treating logical variables
from McBride’s research and combine them with our nominal treatment of level two variables in order to build a system in
which our meta-level consideration of instantiating X can be internalised in, say, the tactics language of a theorem-prover.
This is future work.
Miller’s work [32] also considers existential variables, by considering uniﬁcation with a mixed (i.e. ∀/∃) preﬁx. Normally,
a uniﬁcation problem takes the form ∃x1 . . . xn.s1 = t1 . . . sm = tm. Miller is interested in ﬁnding solutions to problems of
the form Qx1 . . .Qxn.s1 = t1 . . . sm = tm, where Q may represent either a universal or an existential quantiﬁer, and the
terms, si, ti are simply typed λ-terms. A universally quantiﬁed variable behaves like a constant within its scope, whereas
an existentially quantiﬁed variable is available for substitution. Differing sequences of quantiﬁers modify the behaviour
10 The operational behaviour of a language with existential variables is typically to return an instantiation satisfying constraints on those variables, as
in Prolog. Contrast this with functional or ‘universal’ variables λx.p with operational or logical content ‘you can replace me with anything you like’, as in
function application in functional languages.
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of substitutions applied to the equations. For example, ∀ι ⇒ ιf .∃ιx.∀ιw.[(fw) = x] does not have a solution, as the naming
apart of bound variables and substitutions requires that any substitution for x will fail to obtain equality. The quantiﬁer
preﬁx constrains the behaviour of substitutions similarly to ‘nominal style’ freshness conditions. The existence of existential
variables can be used to express ‘incomplete derivations’. Again, the treatment of all variables is ‘traditional’, based on
α-equivalence and capture-avoiding substitution.
Magnusson . ALF is a proof assistant based on Martin-Löf type theory [29]. As far as we know this was the ﬁrst to explicitly
represent incomplete derivations. This is done using proof terms containingmeta-variables (‘place-holders’ in ALF parlance).
Each meta-variable is annotated with a ‘local context’, which is a list of variables upon which an expression to which the
place-holder is reﬁned, may depend. In addition, typing constraints on substituted expressions limit which expressions may
be used to reﬁne a meta-variable [36].
The ALF approach has much in common with the Oleg approach of McBride [31], and with the approaches of Muñoz [35]
and Jojgov [28].
Stoughton, Gunter and Rémy . Stoughton [41] used a system capable of representing incomplete derivations for a programming
language semantics animator, DOPS (DeterministicOPerational Semantics). DOPSuses a typed lambda-calculus as ametalan-
guage, and neither non-determinism nor non-termination of the object language are possible. Stoughton’s representation of
incomplete derivations uses this fact—an incomplete derivation tree is represented as a tree with branches missing coupled
with a ‘resumption’. The action of the resumption is uniquely determined by the evaluation relation of the object language
in question, and extends the coupled tree with new branches, if possible, when executed.
Gunter and Rémy [26] appear to have ﬁrst proposed using representations of incomplete derivations for animating
programming language semantics. They provided a brief informal overview of their idea, but did not expand on it, nor did
they implement a system [41].
Other, distantly related work . We also brieﬂy note contributions by Bognar [4] and Hashimoto and Ohori [27]. Bognar’s calculi
treat terms with holes but their approach is essentially based on ‘traditional’ α-equivalence and λ-lifting, as can be seen for
example in [4, Deﬁnition 4.2.11]. Hashimoto and Ohori [27] admit capturing substitution and use a sophisticated type system
to control it (and its interaction with capture-avoiding substitution whichwe referred to in Section 1). There is no discussion
of how suited these systems would be to a Curry-Howard correspondence.
6.2. Future work
This paper is part of a mathematical project to explore how multi-level systems — with capturing as well as capture-
avoiding substitution — serve as a mathematical foundation for informal practice. In this paper we have seen how the ideas
of two levels of variable, with freshness conditions, and permutations, can be used to as a formal syntax and operational
semantics for a Curry-Howard for incomplete derivations.
We see four broad avenues for building on the system in this paper.
Types for multi-level calculi . The lambda-context calculus [15,16] has levels of variables and an operational semantics, but it
does not feature a nominal terms style α-equivalence based on permutations — in [15], the ﬁrst author wrote about possible
applications to modelling incomplete derivations. Two level λ-calculus has two levels of variable [21]. This has λa and also
a λX , substitution for X does not avoid capture by λa, and nominal terms style α-equivalence.
This paperwould thenbe a rather powerful type system (more thanHindley–Milner for example) for theλX-free fragment
of two level λ-calculus; we are reasonably conﬁdent this would extend to λX . That is for future work.
Implementation . We ask whether the ideas in this paper can be useful for the theory or practice of writing theorem provers.
Can these ideas be reﬁned and extended and applied to represent and program on intermediate proof-states in the kernel of
a theorem-prover?
Nominal uniﬁcation is known to be decidable [44], and Fernández and Calvès have shown that nominal uniﬁcation can be
performed in polynomial time [6]. Further, Fernández and Gabbay [12] provided sufﬁcient conditions on terms for efﬁcient,
polynomial time, nominal rewriting. Thus, nominal terms have some good computational properties which we may be able
to exploit. This need not be too large a job, since the kernel of a theorem-prover can be quite small (a few thousand lines of
code).
Note that we have not developed the mathematics of our representation with efﬁciency in mind (for example, our term-
reduction/derivation-normalisation system is small-step, and non-terminating). Improving the computational properties of
our representation is future work. Note that this is not necessarily very difﬁcult. For example the non-termination could be
dealt with by introducing an explicit substitution. As is often the case, we trade mathematical simplicity for computational
efﬁciency: this would add an extra term-former and lengthen some proofs, which is whywe did not do it here (some further
comment on this issue, follows below).
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In principle, nominal terms may be useful for implementing tactics within a theorem prover. For instance, many tactics
lift subterms of λ-terms into a new context. This operation is complex due to the possibility of inadvertently capturing
variables. Employing similar techniques to those presented in this paper may allow a more straightforward and less error-
prone implementation of complex tactics. It may also be interesting to consider one-and-a-halfth level terms as a language
for communicating incomplete derivations between systems.
Extensions of the system . It should not be hard to change the types and/or the terms of our calculus to suit other logical
systems. For examplewe can followMuñoz and try to enrich types in the direction of a dependent type theory, attempting to
develop the typing rules from Fig. 1 into a dependent type theory similar to that ofMartin-Löf [3]. Thiswould be distinct from
a dependent type theory with elements of nominal techniques [40], which treats atoms (variables of level one) as variable
symbols.
Likewise, we can try to extend the system to other logics, with λ-abstraction for level two variables (following the two
level λ-calculus of [21] or the lambda context calculus of [15,16]), or we can extend with explicit rules for instantiating level
two variables and with constructs internalising other aspects of proof-search like instantiation and backtracking, following
the example of McBride [31].
Finally,wementionedgoal-directedproof theory inSection1 [24]. Thisﬁeldof research isdevoted to the studyof reasoning
from conclusions towards assumptions, and to our knowledge no Curry-Howard correspondence has been developed for
it.11 Thus, it seems a good avenue for future work to apply the techniques used in this paper for a sequent system, to the
goal-directed one.
Improving the system . Our calculus has no strong normalisation result; (λb.((λa.c)a))b (which we also write c[a → a][b →
b], using the notation of Deﬁnition 5) can reduce indeﬁnitely in the empty freshness context, because the β-redexes can
‘skip over’ one another, and the term is typable. For the same reason, strong normalisation is not preserved for the natural
translation of the untyped λ-calculus to the (level 1) fragment of our language; consider the λ-term (λy.((λx.z)x))y.
There is a current of research devoted to creating calculi for computation which are computationally efﬁcient and also
are amenable to mathematical treatment; according to those criteria, it is clear that our calculus could be improved. Note
however that even if computational efﬁciency is not a concern, we can be interested in elegant proofs (see below) andwe can
consider efﬁciency a separate concern, much as one might program in the λ-calculus but execute on an abstract machine. In
particular, one can imagine a version of this calculus in which level 2 variables are annotated with parallel substitutions so
that we can outlaw the ‘skipping’ behaviour mentioned above. This is future work.
So we should now take a critical look at the proofs in this paper, and this brings us to the main issue with this paper. The
proofs are quite long, and rather complex: why?
1. We do not apply the familiar parallel reduction proof-method to prove conﬂuence (attributed to Tait and Martin-Löf
and documented, for example, in Barendregt’s book [2]). Instead, we use a proof-method based on a canonical form
(Deﬁnition 57) and a diagram (Theorem 62). We developed this method for the λ-context calculus [15,16]. At the time
we thought it was original but in fact it is close to one discovered by Takahashi [42].12
This proof-methodhasmuch to commend it; to quote Takahashi commenting onher application of it to prove the theorem
of conﬂuence of the untyped λ-calculus, it is “rigorous, direct, and perhaps the shortest among all the known proofs of
the theorem”. Our proof is longer, but this is just because it is applied to the more complex syntax of this paper.
We consider the proof-method used in this paper to be a feature, not a bug.
We now come to what we consider the main issue with our calculus.
2. The notion of α-equivalence, which is inherited from nominal terms [44], is a source of complexity. First, α-equivalence
depends on a freshness context and is not inherent to terms. This means that we cannot ‘just quotient by α-equivalence’,
because the relation over which wewould like to quotient is dependent on the freshness context. The obvious solution is
to ﬁx one the freshness context, but this is not possible because for conﬂuencewemay speciﬁcallywish to ‘freshly extend
it’ (Deﬁnition 51) with extra fresh atoms. For similar reasons, in the typing rules we introduce a ‘freshly extending’ rule
(Tfr) (Fig. 1).
This combination of factors puts two non-syntax-directed rules in the theory of this paper, (Tfr) and (congα), and we
must argue up to fresh extensions of the freshness context. We trace most of the complexity of this paper to these factors
(for example, the results in Section 5.1 are all devoted to controlling (Tfr)).
Since this paper was written, and as a response to these issues, we have investigated permissive nominal terms and also
semantic nominal terms [10,23,22]. These do awaywith freshness contexts and are based on the idea of inﬁnite and coinﬁnite
sets of atoms (a set is coinﬁnite when its sets complement is inﬁnite). Because sets are coinﬁnite, it is always guaranteed
that there is a fresh atom, so that we can ‘just quotient’ by α-equivalence and there is no need for freshly extended contexts,
nor for rules to handle these things. Developing this further is future research.
11 Dov Gabbay, private communication.
12 Takahashi’s proof still deﬁnes a parallel reduction relation, whereas the proof we give uses just multiple β-reduction, but the underlying ideas of the
two proofs are very similar.
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Appendix
A. ZFA equivariance
Equivariance is well-studied in model theory [43,5]; in a sentence, equivariance states that truth is invariant under
permuting atoms, where an ‘atom’ is an element with no structure, aside from being equal to itself. Variable symbols are an
example of something ‘in nature’ which can naturally be viewed as atomic.
Permutations were used in computer science already in [33]. In [25] equivariance was noted as a meta-mathematical
fact of Fraenkel–Mostowski set theory and used to deduce the some/any property of the ‘NEW’-quantiﬁer and thus derive
new inductive reasoning principles for syntax-with-binding. In [13] equivariance was used in a discursive proof (that is, in
the informal but rigorous mathematical argument of a published paper) to ‘rename variable symbols’ without losing the
inductive hypothesis. In [19, Appendix A], equivariancewas explicitly stated and proved as ameta-mathematical principle of
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theorywith atoms (amore general, andmore standard, foundational system than Fraenkel–Mostowski
set theory, which does not have its ‘ﬁnite support’ property; see [25] for details).
We will now brieﬂy recap on [19, Appendix A], but instead of axiomatic set theory we will use a ‘lighter’ argument based
on von Neumann cumulative hierarchies.
Fix a collection of atoms (recall the sets of level one variables from Section 2.1). Write this setA. Deﬁne a cumulative
hierarchy by:
U0 = A Uα =
⋃
β<α
P(Uβ) ∪ Uβ U =
⋃
α
Uα
HereP denotes the powerset andα andβ range over ordinals. IntuitivelyU is a collection ofwell-founded (possibly inﬁnitely-
branching) trees, which is constructed by transﬁnite induction starting from trees consisting of a single node labelled with
an element ofA. This is the standard model of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with atoms. It is a sufﬁcently rich structure to
build all of usual mathematics, and it has been argued that this is the foundational mathematical universe most commonly
used in ‘practical mathematics’ (rather than Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, without atoms).
A permutation  is a bijection onA (we do not care if {a | (a) /= a} is ﬁnite or not). We deﬁne a permutation action
on U by:
·a = (a) ·U = {·u | u ∈ U}
Here U ∈ U \A and a ∈ A.
Now let terms T and predicates  be inductively deﬁned by:
T ::= X | A
 ::=  ⇒  | ⊥ | ∀X . | T = T | T ∈ T
Here X are variable symbols. This is the language of ﬁrst-order logic. This happens to be very similar to the language of
types investigated in this paper (because we wanted to model an interesting logic), but  here is intended to be a model
of the informal but rigorous mathematical arguments written in English in this paper. In other words, the  model the
statements of lemmas and theorems in this paper, and the theory of truth for over U is sufﬁciently rich to soundly capture
the mathematics in those lemmas and theorems.
It then sufﬁces to observe the following:
Theorem 63. (X1, . . . ,Xn) is true of U , if and only if (·X1, . . . ,·Xn) is true.
Proof. By induction on . It sufﬁces to observe that:
• u ∈ u′ if and only if ·u ∈ ·u′
• u = u′ if and only if ·u = ·u′.
• ·A = A. 
When in the body of this paper we permute variable symbols, we use Theorem 63 to retain the inductive hypothesis.
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